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Born out of a Reagan-era desire to minimize regulatory costs, and not fundamentally 
reconsidered since its inception, the centralized review of agency rulemakings has arguably 
become the most important institutional feature of the regulatory state.  Yet it is a puzzling 
feature: although centralized review is sometimes justified on the ground it could harmonize the 
uncoordinated sprawl of the federal bureaucracy, the agency tasked with regulatory review, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has never embraced that role.  It has instead 
doggedly clung to its original cost-reduction mission, justifying its function as a check on the 
federal bureaucracy with reference to the pervasive belief that agencies will systematically over-
regulate. 
 
This article shows why this belief is wrong.  The claim that agencies are systematically 
biased in favor of regulation finds little support in public choice theory, the political science 
literature, or elsewhere.  In any event, theories predicting rampant over-regulation are no more 
plausible than alternative theories suggesting that agencies will routinely under-regulate.  Even if 
zealous agencies captured by powerful interest groups did characterize the regulatory state, OMB 
review is a curious and poorly designed counterweight.  There is no reason to believe that 
OMB’s location in the Executive Office of the President will inoculate OMB from the 
pathologies that afflict other agencies, and some reason to think that it will exacerbate them.  As 
a response to these problems, we urge a reconsideration of the foundational role that centralized 
review should play in our regulatory state, and a revival and re-conceptualization of the 





CENTRALIZED OVERSIGHT OF THE 
REGULATORY STATE 
Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz 
INTRODUCTION 
Sweeping into office on a promise to reform what he saw as a 
lumbering and wasteful regulatory apparatus, President Reagan in 1981 
tapped the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review agency 
rulemaking and help streamline the administrative state.  Proponents of 
centralized executive review of agency decision-making justified it with 
reference to two goals: the promotion of political accountability, inter-
agency coordination, rational priority-setting, and cost-effective 
rulemaking (the harmonizing function);1 and the curbing of the regulatory 
excesses of overzealous bureaucrats bent on promoting their agencies’ 
narrow agendas (the checking function).2 
In practice, however, Reagan-era centralized review did a lot of 
checking and not much harmonizing.  Indeed, OMB’s advocates were frank 
that its primary function was to create a “rebuttable presumption against 
regulation” in order to curb agencies’ supposed instincts to over-regulate.3  
Less attention was given to the role that OMB was supposed to play in 
providing centralized oversight of the regulatory state.  Given the Reagan 
administration’s “professed aim . . . to cut back significantly, if not actually 
to destroy, the regulatory system established by Congress,” its commitment 
to deregulation at the expense of harmonization is hardly surprising.4  What 
is surprising, however, is that the basic contours of the Reagan-era 
executive review mechanism remain in place today.  In part because 
presidents from both political parties have embraced OMB review, there is 
even an emerging consensus in the administrative law literature that it is 
simply one more neutral tool that the President can use to further his 
administration’s agenda.5 
This Article shows why this view is wrong.  Part I demonstrates that 
many of the features of OMB review create a profound institutional bias 
 
  1 See  E.O. 12,498 pmbl.; Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986). 
  2 Id. at 1081. 
  3 Erik  D.  Olson,  The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NATURAL 
RESOURCES L. 1, 4 (1984) (quoting Reagan-era OIRA director Jim Tozzi). 
  4  Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference With Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062-63 (1986). 
  5 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U.  L.  REV. 461, 463 n.3 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV.  L.  REV. 2245 (2001); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51  DUKE  L.J. 1059, 1070 (2002); 
Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1954-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
601, 713 (2005).  
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against regulation—a bias which is inexplicable except with reference to 
the implicit Reagan-era belief that agencies will systematically over-
regulate.  Advocates justify this bias with reference to a simple and 
remarkably stable story, namely, that health and safety agencies are 
frequently captured by pro-health and safety constituencies, leading 
systematically to overzealous and inefficient regulation.  Because “[w]e all 
know”—or so the story goes—“that a government agency  .  .  . will 
invariably wish to spend ‘too much’ on its goals,” OMB should stand as a 
bulwark against the parochial preferences of pro-regulation agencies and 
promote a national agenda more representative of public preferences.6 
Part II argues that the claim that agencies are systematically biased in 
a pro-regulatory direction finds little support in public choice theory, the 
political science literature, or elsewhere.  Standard public choice accounts 
would suggest that agencies could easily (and more plausibly) reflect anti-
regulatory interests.  Moreover, even if we believed that some agencies 
(say, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) had pro-regulatory 
biases, other federal agencies (say, the Department of Energy (DOE)) 
would be likely to have corresponding anti-regulatory proclivities.  A one-
size-fits-all executive review process that automatically disfavors 
regulation is therefore inappropriate.  We similarly conclude that no other 
accounts of bureaucratic over-zealousness—whether based on 
administrators’ purported budget-maximizing preferences,,hyper-cautious 
risk assessors, a bureaucratic staff’s identification with its agency’s 
mission, or stories about how political appointees inevitably “go native”—
provide plausible support for the view that we challenge.  Even if the 
regulatory state were in fact characterized by zealous agencies captured by 
powerful interest groups, Part III argues that OMB review is a poorly 
designed solution to that problem for the simple reason that OMB’s 
location within the Executive Office of the President does not immunize it 
from the pathologies that affect other agencies. 
Because of its unwarranted embrace of an unjustifiable anti-regulatory 
mission, OMB review has largely failed to capitalize on its potential to 
promote regulatory rationality.  Part IV therefore urges a reconsideration of 
the foundational role that OMB review should play in the regulatory state, 
and a revival and re-conceptualization of the neglected harmonization 
principles that once ostensibly animated it.  Cost-benefit analysis would 
remain a cornerstone of its work.  But many other issues are amenable to 
centralized review, and we offer several suggestions as to what a 
centralized agency dedicated to playing a harmonization role might do.   
Most importantly, however, we recommend that scholars discard outmoded 
theories of bureaucratic behavior and begin thinking seriously about 
reshaping OMB review to further the positive role it can play as a 
harmonizing force in the administrative state. 
 




THE ANTI-REGULATORY ROLE OF OMB UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Within a month of his inauguration in 1981, President Reagan 
promulgated Executive Order 12,291 and asserted an unprecedented level 
of control over the administrative apparatus.  Encouraged by a groundswell 
of commentators urging more robust executive control of the administrative 
state7 and an electoral mandate to curb overzealous agencies, Reagan called 
on agencies to weigh the costs of their regulations against their anticipated 
benefits8 and installed OMB as the final arbiter of the substantive 
appropriateness of newly promulgated regulations.9  Reagan also 
promulgated Executive Order 12,498, which required regulatory agencies 
to submit annual regulatory plans to OMB—more specifically, to the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—each year to ensure 
“consistency with the goals of the Administration”10 and to curtail 
agencies’ capacity to deviate from those pre-announced plans.11  The two 
orders, taken together, “placed OIRA in the center of regulatory 
planning.”12 
Reagan’s supporters provided two often-conflated justifications for 
executive control: the need for centralized review of agency decision-
making to promote a coordinated and cost-effective administrative state;13 
and the need to curb the excesses of regulators bent on promoting their 
agencies’ narrow agendas.14  To conservatives in the 1980s, the conflation 
of the two justifications was natural: Rational administration necessarily 
meant less administration.15 
Unsurprisingly, the newly minted review process provoked 
controversy.16  Critics argued that cost-benefit analysis would in practice be 
used as a tool not for the accurate calibration of regulations, but as an 
analytically (and politically) respectable method of curbing the 
 
  7 See,  e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald, J.); Lloyd N. 
Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395, 1414 
(1975). 
  8  E.O. 12,866 § 2(b). 
  9 Id. § 3. 
  10  E.O. 12,498 § 1(d). 
  11 Id. at § 3(c). 
  12  Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
  13 See  E.O. 12,498 pmbl. 
  14 DeMuth  &  Ginsburg,  supra note 1, at 1081; see also Morrison, supra note 4, at 1061 (“The 
charge was that many agencies were administering their laws with no consideration of other 
interests or the economic effect of their decisions.”). 
  15 See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1081  (“Centralized review of proposed 
regulation under a cost/benefit standard, by an office that has  no program responsibilities and is 
accountable only to the president, is an appropriate response to the failings of regulation . . . 
Assessments of social costs and benefits force regulators to confront problems of covert 
redistribution and overzealous pursuit of agency goals, which experience has shown to be 
common in regulatory programs.”). 
  16  For discussions of this view, see THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: 
THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Olson, supra 
note 3; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 4-6.  
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administrative state.  Particularly because OIRA involved itself only at the 
tail end of a long rulemaking process, at which point it was “virtually 
impossible to do anything productive,”17 critics feared that OIRA would 
thwart the implementation of needed regulations.  OIRA’s tiny staff was 
charged with reviewing thousands of technically complex rules, leading to 
the charge that OIRA review would necessarily impose costly and lengthy 
delays on agency action.18  If that were not enough, the secrecy of OIRA 
review would give regulated industries unprecedented access to the 
administrative machinery.19  In short, under Reagan’s orders, regulatory 
benefits would be systematically undervalued, costs systematically 
inflated—and the administrative state would grind to a halt. 
When President Clinton was elected in 1992, many observers 
expected that he would abandon a Reagan-era executive review process 
that had been so thoroughly tagged as biased.20  Recognizing, however, that 
Reagan’s innovation gave him an opportunity to exercise substantial 
control over an ever-more important regulatory state, Clinton instead co-
opted the Reagan orders and made them his own.  Executive Order 12,866, 
issued in 1993, cemented OIRA review of “significant regulatory 
action[s]”21 while maintaining the existing structure of the regulatory 
review process.22  In response to critics, however, the Clinton order 
imposed more robust disclosure requirements,23 emphasized that agencies 
should weigh “qualitative measures,” including “distributive impacts” and 
“equity,” when engaging in cost-benefit analysis,24 and set deadlines that 
prevented OIRA from permanently stalling the implementation of a 
regulation.25  Important academic commentators, most notably Richard 
Pildes and Cass Sunstein, thoughtfully scrutinized Clinton’s reformed 
executive review process and were guardedly optimistic about the 
possibilities of a more rational and democratically legitimate administrative 
state.26 
In recent years, the functional appropriateness of Executive Order 
12,866 as a template for executive control of the administrative process has 
not been seriously challenged.  The tacit assumption, bolstered particularly 
by Elena Kagan’s article detailing Clinton’s harnessing of the 
administrative state to his own progressive political ends,27 is that OMB 
 
  17  E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
167, 169 (1994). 
  18  Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 5. 
  19 Olson,  supra note 3, at 31-35. 
  20  Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 6. 
  21  E.O. 12,866 § 2(f) (“‘significant regulatory action’ means any regulation action that is 
likely to result in a rule that [inter alia] may . . . [h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more . . .”). 
  22 See  Kagan, supra note 5, at; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 6. 
  23 Id.  § 6(b)(4). 
  24 Id.  § 1(a). 
  25 Id.  § 6(b)(2). 
  26  Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 12, at 125-26. 
  27 See  Kagan, supra note 5, at 2281-2319.  
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review is a neutral tool that can promote a pro- or anti-regulatory agenda 
depending on its implementation.  On this view, George W. Bush’s 
decision to continue to operate under Clinton’s executive order was natural: 
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. 
Without denying that it provides a sitting president, Democrat or 
Republican, with a powerful tool to promote his political agenda, we 
submit that this view fails to consider that Executive Order 12,866—based 
as it is on an order designed explicitly to promote an anti-regulatory 
agenda—contains within it several structural  and institutional  biases 
against regulation.  First, OIRA reviews agency rules only to determine 
whether the benefits of the regulation warrant the costs, and therefore 
whether the regulation is too stringent.  But, of course, the regulation could 
be too lax and cost-benefit analysis might call for a more robust regulatory 
response.  Second, OIRA rarely reviews agency decisions to deregulate 
with the same rigor that it reviews new regulations.  OIRA thus stands as a 
structural roadblock on the path of regulation, but not deregulation—an 
asymmetry which cannot be justified on cost-benefit grounds.  Third, 
perhaps most importantly, OIRA generally does not review agency 
inaction.  Agency inertia is therefore privileged under the current system of 
OIRA review, and many regulations that would have positive net benefits 
are never enacted.  Fourth, at least two procedural features of OIRA review 
cut against regulation: the delay associated with OIRA review (exacerbated 
by OIRA’s small size), and OIRA’s exemption from the constraints of the 
APA.  To be sure, some of OIRA’s anti-regulatory bent can be attributed to 
politics; Republican presidents have after all overseen OIRA for all but 
eight of its twenty-five year existence.  But whatever the political 
affiliation of the President, this Part shows that several aspects of OIRA’s 
institutional design work together to impose a sizeable drag on the 
regulatory state. 
A.  The Selective Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In practice, OIRA reviews agencies’ cost-benefit analyses only to 
ensure that they do not enact regulations with costs that exceed their 
benefits.28  As a historical matter, this approach  makes sense: from its 
 
  28 See STEPHEN  G.  BREYER ET AL.,  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW  &  REGULATORY  POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 140 (5th ed. 2002) (noting common critique that “OIRA’s analysis 
is weighted too heavily in favor of minimizing costs”); CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY 
DECISION MAKING [x](1988) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION] (“Policy actions [at OMB] 
have largely focused on the economic impacts of individual rules and regulatory initiatives and on 
preventing the promulgation of regulations that appear too costly.  Few initiatives have been 
taken to control threats to public health and the environment.”); Elliott, supra note 17, at 172 
(recalling from his years as EPA’s general counsel OMB’s “typical concern—that the rule was 
too expensive”); Morrison, supra note 4, at 1065 (“[T]he system of OMB review created by the 
Executive Orders [has been used] to implement a myopic vision of the regulatory process which 
places the elimination of cost to industry above all other considerations.”); Robert V. Percival, 
Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 
L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 161 (1991) (“Executive Office reviewers have consistently sought to  
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inception, “OIRA’s basic mission has been to stop unjustified rules,”29 and 
using cost-benefit analysis to strike down and revise rules that impose 
regulatory costs that exceed regulatory benefits serves this mission 
admirably well. 
But by failing to concentrate on those cases in which agencies enact 
regulations where the net benefits have not been maximized—in other 
words, those cases when imposing greater costs would yield even greater 
benefits—OIRA’s use of cost-benefit review operates as a one-way ratchet.  
Lax agency regulations can run the gauntlet of OIRA review unscathed, 
whereas more-stringent rules run a very real risk of being struck down.  
While the administrative state thus grows ever-leaner as OIRA review 
compensates for one kind of inefficiency (over-regulation), the full 
potential of the administrative apparatus remains untapped because OIRA 
review does not compensate for a different kind of inefficiency (under-
regulation). 
OIRA’s denials notwithstanding,30 there is substantial evidence that 
emphasizing the cost side of the cost-benefit ledger remains a pervasive 
and entrenched feature of OIRA review.  For example, in an extensive 
2003 report on OIRA, the General Accounting Office (GAO) traced 
OIRA’s influence on the 393 economically significant rules that had been 
altered during the formal OIRA review process over a one-year period.  
GAO found seventeen rules that had been “significantly changed” during 
that process, fourteen of which came from EPA.31  Noting that “attention to 
the cost side of economic effects was most prevalent in OIRA’s comments 
and suggestions,”32 the report found that six EPA rules were changed to 
eliminate regulatory provisions or delay their implementation; four were 
altered so as to favor regulatory alternatives that imposed fewer costs on 
regulated entities; and three were sent back for revisions to be made in the 
calculation of costs and benefits.33  None of these rules were made more 
 
make the regulations EPA does issue less stringent.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 5, at 1069 (“What 
OIRA desk officers share . . . is a focus on the costs of regulation, which makes it likely that they 
will object to a rule if there is uncertainty about whether the regulatory benefits are sufficient to 
justify the costs of the rule.”); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for 
Improving Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1489, 1489 (2002) (“For over twenty years, the executive branch of the federal government has 
required regulatory agencies to assess the costs and benefits of regulation, and to attempt to 
ensure that the benefits outweigh, or justify, the costs.”) (emphasis added).  But see John D. 
Graham, Reigning in the Regulatory State: The Smart-Regulation Agenda, CATO Institute Hill 
Briefing, Oct. 3, 2003 (claiming that OIRA is not “uniformly pro-regulation or anti-regulation in 
our decision making”). 
  29  Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1521. 
  30 John Graham, Smarter Regulation: Progress and Unfinished Business, Address at the 
Kennedy School of Government (Sept. 25, 2003), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/speeches/030925graham.html (“We are not uniformly 
pro-regulation or anti-regulation in our decision making, despite what your image of conservative 
Republicans may be.”). 
  31 G ENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND THE 
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON OIRA]. 
  32 Id.  at 87. 
  33 Id.  at 76-78.  
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stringent (i.e., more costly for industry) in an effort to capture greater net 
benefits.  David Driesen examined those same rulemakings in a 2005 study 
and concluded that OIRA review “never moves in the direction of 
encouraging more stringent regulation than the agency would adopt on its 
own, even when benefits far outweighed costs.”34 
This review process’s assymetry moreover has a pernicious effect on 
agencies’ incentives to promulgate rules.  Aware that over-regulation may 
lead to reversal while under-regulation will go unchecked, rationally risk-
averse agencies initiating significant regulatory actions will, in the face of 
asymmetrical OIRA review, have powerful incentives to make their 
regulations less stringent (i.e., impose fewer compliance costs) if the 
expected benefits of a particular regulation are contingent, fairly 
contestable, or difficult to quantify35—that is, nearly always.36  An agency 
that believes a watered-down regulation is preferable to no regulation at all 
will be sorely tempted to craft regulations that may not maximize net 
benefits but will nevertheless not attract unwelcome attention from OIRA.37  
This dynamic effect will also extend to agency decisions of what to 
regulate: confronted with biased OIRA review, agencies will naturally 
devote scarce resources to rulemakings that are less vulnerable to the 
charge that they reflect a too-rosy assessment of regulatory benefits.38 
B.  Little Review of Deregulation 
Because “OMB often does not intensively review deregulatory 
measures,”39 agencies can more easily nix old regulations, or make them 
less stringent, than implement new ones.  This imbalance—which contrasts 
with the judiciary’s even-handed practice of scrutinizing agency decisions 
to deregulate40— sharply favors deregulatory initiatives over proregulatory 
alternatives. 
The asymmetry of the process appealed to OIRA’s Reagan-era 
advocates, who wanted to check agencies that were regulating “too much,” 
 
  34  David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, at 48 (forthcoming 2005, on file with 
authors). 
  35 See  Seidenfeld, supra note 5, at 1075 (“OMB review is likely to encourage the agency to 
propose a rule that may be less effective but also less costly than the rule the agency otherwise 
would consider best.”). 
  36 See  Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO.  L.J. 2255 (2002) (detailing 
highly contingent nature of cost-benefit analysis, particularly on the benefits side). 
  37  Similarly, commentators have noted that the risk of reversal creates incentives for agencies 
to generate a regulatory record that, whatever its utility for the rulemaking process, will satisfy a 
judicial inquiry.  See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS (1988). 
  38 See,  e.g., Olson, supra note 3, at 50 (noting that EPA starts off with “reduced expectations” 
and engages in a “guessing game” to “draft rules it believes will clear OMB”).  DOT refuses, for 
example, to propose certain types of regulatory provisions that it knows will run into trouble at 
OIRA.  GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 130. 
  39 Driesen,  supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 15. 
  40 See  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (“[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule obligated to supply a 
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act 
in the first instance.”).  
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not rein in agencies that were deregulating “too much.”41  Deregulation was 
the entire point.42  As a result, during the 1980s and the early 1990s, OIRA 
“applied its criteria selectively, requiring no analysis for proposals that 
eliminate regulation, and no cost analysis for those that relax existing 
standards.”43 
The practice under Clinton’s executive order, however, has allegedly 
been different.  Under Executive Order 12,866, deregulatory initiatives fall 
within OIRA’s jurisdiction over “significant regulatory actions” because 
deregulation can “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more,” including non-monetary effects.44  In line with this language, OIRA 
has been careful to express an interest in reviewing the cost-benefit 
analyses that accompany deregulatory rulemakings.45  And to facilitate 
OIRA review, deregulatory initiatives from the agencies do often come 
accompanied by regulatory impact analyses that monetize costs and 
benefits,46 although these analyses rarely provide a quantitative assessment 
of the costs and benefits of alternative regulatory options (such as imposing 
a more-stringent alternative).47 
Experience suggests that OIRA does not carefully scrutinize 
deregulatory cost-benefit analyses, however.  We offer one important 
example relating to EPA’s promulgation of a 2002 rule relaxing new source 
review (NSR) requirements for existing pollution sources.48  The scope of 
the rule is broad, applying to all “stationary sources” in the United States, 
with a “stationary source” defined as any facility “which emits or may emit 
any air pollutant”—a definition that includes all power plants, oil 
refineries, manufacturing plants, and utilities in the country.49 
Although the details are quite complex, the Clean Air Act essentially 
splits stationary sources into two groups, existing sources and new sources.  
While any new sources must intsall tight environmental controls, only 
minimal federal environmental regulation covers existing sources—in other 
 
  41 See  Olson, supra note 3, at 54 (reporting that “if an EPA action relaxes a standard, there is 
likely to be no effort on OMB’s part to assess the costs and benefits of the action”); Percival, 
supra note 28, at 188 (noting that OIRA cleared EPA’s rescission or relaxation of lead standards 
because it would not have an significant adverse economic impact). 
  42  E.O. 12,291 pmbl. (giving top billing to the goal of “reduc[ing] the burdens of existing and 
future regulations”). 
  43 Oliver  A.  Houck,  President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
535, 542 (1987) (internal cites removes). 
  44  E.O. 12,866 § 3(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
  45 OIRA, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1 (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4] 
(“This requirement applies to rulemakings that rescind or modify existing rules as well as to 
rulemakings that establish new requirements.”). 
  46 See,  e.g., Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products, 66 Fed. Reg. 38822 (July 
25, 2001) (quantifying costs and benefits of less-stringent new regulation). 
  47  Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 874 
(2000). 
  48  EPA, Final Rule, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New 
Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual 
Methodology, Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 
Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002). 
  49 CAA  §  111(a)(3).  
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words, these sources are “grandfathered” in.50  To stave off obsolescence, 
however, these older and more-polluting stationary sources will eventually 
have to renovate their facilities or else face closure.  The catch is that under 
the Clean Air Act these existing sources will be considered “new 
sources”—thereby triggering NSR and forcing the plants to implement 
state-of-the-art environmental standards—whenever they undergo “any 
modification,” which includes anything beyond routine maintenance that 
increases pollution.51  Older plants thus have strong incentives to put off 
renovating their facilities, and will sometimes be deterred from making 
productivity-enhancing upgrades that might also lower emission rates.52 
EPA’s new rule relaxes its definition of “modification” to give 
existing facilities additional flexibility to upgrade their facilities without 
triggering NSR.53  That flexibility would allow existing sources to 
modernize, but it would also allow them to delay, perhaps indefinitely, the 
day on which they become too old to operate productively—creating a very 
real risk that grandfathered plants will never be retired in favor of newer, 
cleaner facilities. 54 
EPA undertook a screening analysis in which it determined that the 
new rule would not have effects (either increasing costs or reducing 
benefits) above $100 million and was therefore not “economically 
significant.”55  As a result, EPA declined to submit the rule to formal cost-
benefit analysis.  OIRA concurred that the rule was not significant, but 
asked EPA for a more-extensive cost-benefit analysis on the grounds that 
the new rule was important public policy.  EPA demurred, citing gaps in its 
data, and OIRA ultimately agreed that formal cost-benefit analysis was 
unrealistic.56 
All of this would be unexceptionable but for the fact that OIRA did 
not contest EPA’s implausible contention that the end result of its new 
rules would be to improve environmental quality.57  EPA based this 
conclusion on self-serving anecdotal evidence from four industry groups, 
which claimed that the previous incarnation of NSR rules caused them to 
reject various interim energy-efficiency projects, and that therefore making 
the rules less stringent might reduce emissions overall.58  Yet virtually all 
 
  50  CAA §§ 111 (laying out “standards of performance for new stationary sources”); 165(a)(4) 
(requiring new sources to use the “best available control technology”); 169(3) (defining best 
available control technology as a standard no less rigorous than the new source performance 
standard of § 111). 
  51  CAA § 111(4); 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876, 24,877 (Dec. 23, 1971). 
  52  For a comprehensive discussion of this effect, see Johathan Remy Nash & Richard L. 
Revesz, The Law and Economics of New Source Review (forthcoming 2006). 
  53  Or rather, a pair of rules.  See id. at [x]. 
  54 Id.  at [x]. 
  55 GAO REPORT, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD USE AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE 
EFFECTS OF ITS REVISION TO THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 10 (2003) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT ON CAA]. 
  56 Id.  at 13. 
  57 Id.  at 4. 
  58 Id.  at 17.  
 
10 
objective observers believe that EPA’s prediction is flat-out wrong.59  The 
non-partisan National Association of Public Administration (NAPA), for 
example, contends that the new NSR rules would “thwart the intent of 
Congress for NSR to promote replacing or upgrading old, more polluting 
equipment.”60  EPA’s own Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded 
that the rules had been promulgated without adequate support and would 
hamstring effective EPA enforcement efforts.61  The “usually staid” 
American Lung Association, together with a consortium of environmental 
groups, predicted strong increases in pollutants and called the new rule “the 
most harmful and unlawful air-pollution initiative ever undertaken by the 
federal government.”62 And a vast majority of the states’ environmental 
officials who responded to a GAO survey indicated they believed 
emissions would increase as a result of the new rule.63 
In spite of the evidence that EPA misstated the effects of its new NSR 
rule, OIRA declined to press it to generate a cost-benefit analysis.  It did 
not even question EPA’s bizarre determination that the NSR rule was not 
“economically significant.”64  Given the broad scope of the NSR rule and 
its manifest importance to the environment and the economy, OIRA’s 
failure to push EPA to monetize costs and benefits suggests a relative 
nonchalance about the effects of deregulation—a nonchalance that, as 
discussed above, OIRA does not share with respect to regulation. 
In short, the experience with the NSR rule, coupled with a long 
institutional history in which deregulation fell outside the scope of its 
authority, raise a powerful inference that OIRA does not review 
deregulatory rulemakings with the same rigor that it reviews regulations 
imposing compliance costs. 
C.  No Review of Regulatory Inaction 
An even more profound objection to OIRA review is that it is almost 
wholly reactive: an agency submits a proposed rule to OIRA, and OIRA 
reviews it to ensure that it passes cost-benefit muster and is in line with the 
president’s priorities.65  Agencies’ decisions not to regulate can be every bit 
as costly to society as overly expensive regulations, however;66 “studies 
 
  59 See  Nash & Revesz, supra note 52, at [x]. 
  60 N ATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING 
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 117-19, 141 (2003). 
  61 O FFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULE CHANGE HARMS EPA’S 
ABILITY TO ENFORCE  AGAINST  COAL-FIRED  UTILITIES 14-20, 22-28 (Sep. 30, 2004), at 
http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/2004/20040930-2004-P-00034.pdf. 
  62 Bruce  Barcott,  Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Apr. 4, 2004, § 6, at 38. 
  63 Jennifer  8 Lee, Most States Expect Pollution to Rise if Regulations Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 6, 2004, at A1. 
  64 GAO REPORT ON CAA , supra note 55, at 17. 
  65 OIRA, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COST 
AND  BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS 21 (2002) [hereinafter 2002  REPORT TO CONGRESS] 
(“Historically, OIRA has been a reactive force in the regulatory process, responding to proposed 
and final rulemakings generated by Federal agencies.”). 
  66 John  D.  Graham,  The Failure of Agency-Forcing, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 121 (“Both types of 
error are costly to society.”).  
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show that adding some regulations, while removing or improving others, 
could save tens of thousands of lives and millions of dollars annually, thus 
giving simultaneous boosts to health, safety, and economic growth.”67  But 
until recently, there was no institutional mechanism at OIRA to prompt 
recalcitrant agencies to regulate when cost-benefit analysis would support 
the implementation of a new rule.68 
In 2001, however, OIRA announced that it would begin sending 
“prompt letters” in an effort “to bring a policy matter to the attention of 
agencies” and goad them into needed regulatory action.69  S i n c e  t h e n ,  
OIRA has issued fourteen prompt letters to a number of agencies on a 
variety of issues.  For instance, OIRA has asked OSHA to “consider 
whether promotion of [automatic external defibrillators (AEDs)] should be 
elevated to a priority;”70 requested more information from EPA about its 
implementation of a congressional beach-protection act;71 and encouraged 
USDA and HHS to consider the risks of trans-fatty acids and the benefits of 
omega-3 fatty acids in revising the dietary guidelines and the food 
pyramid.72  John Graham points to his “innovation” of prompt letters, 
which “represent the first time that [OIRA] has publicly used its analytic 
resources to encourage new regulatory actions as opposed to reviewing 
decisions initiated by agencies,” as evidence that OIRA now utilizes cost-
benefit analysis in a more even-handed fashion.73 
Without denying that the prompt letter is a salutary development, there 
are several reasons to be skeptical that OIRA has embraced a regulation-
spurring function.74  First, the prompt letter is not an institutionalized 
feature of centralized review, but is rather an ad hoc OIRA innovation not 
mandated by the text of the executive order.  Perhaps for that reason, OIRA 
has inadequate resources to support the promulgation of prompt letters.   
OIRA’s staff consists of just fifty-five full-time employees, only twenty-
two of whom actually review regulations.75  Those twenty-two employees 
must review roughly 600 economically significant rules a year,76 for an 
allocation of more than twenty-seven  rulemakings for each analyst per 
 
  67  Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1521-22. 
  68 Id  .at 1522 (“no institution in government has yet vindicated the hopes of those who 
believed that cost-benefit analysis could be used to . . . spur agency action when it is justified.”). 
  69 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 65, at 21-22. 
  70  Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary 
of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration (Sept. 18, 2001), at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/osha_prompt_letter.html. 
  71 Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to Benjamin Grumbles, Acting 
Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/epa_beach-act-2000.pdf. 
  72  Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions 
by Regulators, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-35.html (2001). 
  73 Id. 
  74 See  GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 38 (noting that some “recent OIRA policies 
and practices are only incrementally different from those evident in previous administrations or 
have caveats that must be recognized in their implementation”). 
  75 Id.  at 60 n.21. 
  76 Id.  at 24.  
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year—or about one every two weeks.  Given the technical complexity of 
most of these important regulations, it is hard to imagine that analysts have 
enough time to review the regulations agencies have proposed, much less 
consider the potential costs and benefits of regulations they haven’t.  
Unsurprisingly, then, OIRA has only issued fourteen prompt letters in four 
years—an improvement over the status quo, to be sure, but hardly a 
revolution in regulatory oversight.  This rate of production—three or four 
prompt letters per year—is moreover insignificant when considered against 
the twenty-five rules that GAO discovered that OIRA “significantly 
affected” (normally by lowering compliance costs) over a single one-year 
period.77 
Second, prompt letters are simply mechanisms to “bring issues to the 
attention of agencies in a transparent manner that permits public scrutiny 
and debate,”78 and as such are not necessarily pro-regulatory tools.  Prompt 
letters can pressure agencies to deregulate as effectively as they can 
pressure them to regulate.  John Graham acknowledges as much: “The 
prompt letter is not simply a pro-regulatory tool; we will be using it to 
encourage agency efforts to streamline the regulatory process.”79 
Predictably, then, the prompt letters do not reflect consistent attempts 
to push agencies to implement costly but beneficial regulations,80 but rather 
a hodgepodge of reform efforts that include suggestions to strip away old 
regulations that may no longer provide net benefits.  For example, OIRA 
sent one of its most important prompt letters to a set of independent 
agencies in January 2003, asking them to consider a raft of forty-nine 
regulatory-reform proposals that had been submitted to OIRA.81  Industry 
groups suggested most of the reforms,82 which included petitions to the 
FCC that it revoke its recent rule requiring cellular phone companies to 
allow consumers to keep their same number when switching cellular 
services,83 and to the FTC that it weaken a regulation granting a three-day 
 
  77 Id.  at 72. 
  78 Press  Release,  supra note 72. 
  79 John D. Graham, Presidential Management of the Regulatory State, Address Before 
Weidenbaum Center Forum (Dec. 17, 2001), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_speech121701.html. 
  80 See  Driesen, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 49-52.  Contrary to Driesen’s 
argument that “[n]one of the prompt letters addressing environmental, health, and safety 
regulation sought to initiate fresh regulation,” id. at 50, a few prompt letters have pushed for the 
prioritization of tighter health and safety regulations.  For instance, OIRA asked OSHA to 
consider making AED promotion a regulatory priority, and urged NHTSA to consider using a 
certain kind of crash test.  Driesen dismisses the OSHA letter because OIRA left the ultimate 
choice of whether to regulate to OSHA, and the NHTSA letter because assessing the new crash 
test was already on NHTSA’s regulatory agenda.  Id. at 51.  But nudging agency priorities can be 
an important part of inciting regulation.  Driesen’s main point nonetheless holds: that the prompt 
letters are rarely geared towards increasing the stringency of health and safety regulations. 
  81  Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to the Heads of Selected 
Independent Agencies (Jan. 22, 2003), at  http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/ 
graham_response_regreform.pdf. 
  82 GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 109. 
  83 OIRA, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: SUMMARIES OF PUBLIC SUGGESTIONS FOR 
REFORM OF REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE  DOCUMENTS 236 (2002), at  
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right of rescission to consumers who buy anything worth more than $25 
from door-to-door salesmen.84  Another prompt letter raised concerns with 
DOE’s National Energy Modeling System, which OIRA claimed 
insufficiently took into account the views of “some industry observers” 
regarding the market penetration of hybrid and diesel cars.85  Readjusting 
the modeling system to account for a dramatic and highly speculative 
increase in the market penetration of fuel-efficient cars, however, would 
reduce DOE’s projections as to how much fuel American drivers are likely 
to burn in the future—a change which would have the effect of making 
less-stringent fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles more attractive.  Of 
the remaining prompt letters, “[t]he overwhelming majority . . . endorsed 
ongoing efforts to improve disclosure and use of information,” not making 
regulations more stringent so as to reap larger net benefits.86 
Third, OIRA has concentrated its proactive reform efforts not on 
prompt letters, but on generating what have become known as “hit lists” of 
costly regulations.87  In May 2001, OIRA issued a public request for 
suggestions of agency rules that should be rescinded or modified in order to 
reduce regulatory burdens.88  It received seventy-one suggestions, a 
majority of which came from a research center headed up by a Reagan-era 
OIRA administrator,89 and chose twenty-three of them for “high priority 
review.”90  Since this first effort in 2001, OIRA has called annually for new 
nominations to the hit list,91 and in 2004 it reported to Congress that groups 
seeking regulatory relief had made 189 nominations for regulatory 
changes.92  GAO noted in 2003 that “many rules nominated for reform are 
being changed,” and that the trend is likely to continue.93  The result is that 
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/summaries_nominations_final.pdf. 
  84 Id. at 269. 
  85  Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to Mary Hutzler, Director, Office of 
Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Department of Energy (Feb. 24, 2003), at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/prompt-ltr_eia.pdf. 
  86 Driesen,  supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52. 
  87 OMB  Watch,  The Problems with Any OIRA Hit List, Jan. 10, 2005, at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2596/1/309?TopicID=3. 
  88 GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 103. 
  89 Id. at 6 n.4. 
  90 Id.  at 103. 
  91 Chastened by public outcry over the industry orientation of most of the parties that 
nominated rules, OIRA in 2002 and 2003 expressed an interest in hearing about possible 
regulatory “changes,” including the promulgation of new rules or an expansion of existing rules, 
that would maximize net benefits.  GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 108.  Still, “most of 
the nominations sought modifications that would increase regulatory flexibility or rescind rules,  
id. at 109, and in any event the abrupt about-face suggests that “the only reforms [OIRA] truly 
[seeks] are those that favor the manufacturing sector by rolling back” health, safety, and 
environmental protection.”  OMB Watch, supra note 87.  This suspicion was confirmed in 2004, 
when OIRA returned to asking for “nominations of specific regulations, guidance documents or 
paperwork requirements that, if reformed, would result in substantive reductions in regulatory 
burden.”  OIRA, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS 58 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS] 
(emphasis added). 
  92 Id.  at 3. 
  93 GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 103 (chapter title).  
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OIRA publicly touts the prompt letter as a proregulatory and proactive 
mechanism for regulatory reform while lavishing most of its attention on 
rolling back regulatory burdens on industry.94 
In short, the prompt letter is a sideshow.  The main event remains 
reviewing regulations to ensure that they do not impose disproportionate 
regulatory costs.  A new executive order with an invigorated dedication to 
prompting meaningful regulations, together with additional resources, 
would be necessary to fully institutionalize an innovation like the prompt 
letter.  In the meantime, the basic mission of OIRA remains the same as it 
was under President Reagan. 
D.  Procedural Biases 
Two procedural biases of OIRA review also push in an anti-regulatory 
direction.  First, there is the delay associated with OIRA review.  Agencies 
must submit their rules to OIRA and wait for its approval before they issue 
them, slowing an already cumbersome regulatory process.  Because the 
same delay does not generally attach to deregulatory initiatives,95 the length 
of OIRA review puts deregulatory measures at an advantage over 
proregulatory alternatives.  This asymmetrical delay can sometimes be so 
burdensome as to operate as an effective veto over more-stringent 
regulation: during the Reagan and first Bush administrations, delay was 
OIRA’s tactic of choice for stifling costly new regulations.96 
In response to widespread condemnation of this tactic, Clinton’s 
executive order imposed a 90-day cap (subject to a single 30-day 
extension) on the time that OIRA could review regulations.97  John 
Graham’s OIRA takes this requirement seriously, and the number of 
reviews that last longer than 90 days has dropped considerably over the 
past few years.98  This pattern may be somewhat deceptive, however: the 
number of return letters and “voluntary” rule withdrawals have also 
increased, leading to the possibility that Graham’s adherence to the 90-day 
window may reflect his greater willingness to force an agency to go back to 
the drawing board.99  What is more, OIRA has taken to coordinating with 
agencies at early stages of the rulemaking process; its intervention may 
therefore delay rulemaking during these initial negotiations, even if it does 
not unduly hamper regulations during the formal review process.100 
At any rate, OIRA review stands as yet another hoop for agencies to 
 
  94 See  Driesen, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 53. 
  95 See  supra  Part I.B. 
  96 See Judith Havemann, OMB’s Pledge: No More Foot-Dragging; Darmon Concedes 
Agency Procrastinated in Reviewing Regulations, WASH. POST, July 4, 1989, at A21.  For a 
thorough review of the ways in which OIRA used delay to impede the promulgation of rules in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, see Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1428-36 (1992). 
  97  E.O. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(B)-(C). 
  98 GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 46. 
  99 Id. at 45-48. 
  100 Id. at 47-48.  
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jump through before their regulations can become effective.  So long as 
similar delay does not attach to deregulatory rulemakings, the overall effect 
is to delay the time when the net benefits of regulation can begin to be 
realized. 
Second, the APA does not apply to OIRA,101 inoculating its decisions 
from judicial review and making disclosure of its outside contacts with 
regulated entities a less-pressing concern for the agency.  Undisclosed and 
rampant industry contacts were a substantial problem in the 1980s, when 
OIRA came under fire for its cozy and secretive relationships with industry 
representatives.102  Sensitive to this issue, Clinton’s order mandated that 
OIRA publicly disclose “[a]ll substantive communication” between OIRA 
and outside parties “regarding a regulatory action under review.”103  The 
disclosure requirements are, at least on paper, fairly robust: OIRA must 
send copies of any written communication it receives to the relevant 
agencies;104 must keep a log of all of its interactions with outside parties;105 
and must invite an agency representative to any meetings it holds with 
outside parties.106 
In practice, however, OIRA still offers a sheltered haven for regulated 
entities to advance a deregulatory agenda.107  First, the disclosure 
requirements cover only the period of formal OIRA review,108 despite 
OIRA’s recent re-emphasis on early and informal involvement in agency 
rulemakings.109  Although OIRA’s current “informal practice” is to disclose 
communications between OIRA and outside parties relating to a 
rulemaking that OIRA has received in draft form, this practice is not a 
codified institutional feature of OIRA review.110  Moreover, the disclosure 
requirements do not apply at the similarly important “preinformal review” 
stage of the process that takes place before a draft rule has been reduced to 
writing.111  Second, the absence of the threat of judicial review makes 
OIRA sloppy: according to GAO, many of OIRA’s disclosures “[are] not 
very informative,” and include only sketchy information about the outside 
parties involved, the rule at issue, or the changes discussed.112  GAO 
concluded that “OIRA’s practice of providing minimal information to the 
 
  101 See  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (holding that the president is 
not an “agency” subject to the APA, despite the APA’s inclusive language); Fred Anderson et al., 
Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial 
Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 89, 127 (2001) (because the president is outside of the 
ambit of the APA, “courts do not engage in direct review of OIRA oversight today”). 
  102 Olson,  supra note 3, at 40-73. 
  103  E.O. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B). 
  104 Id.  § 6(b)(4)(B)(ii). 
  105 Id.  § 6(b)(4)(C). 
  106 Id. § 6(b)(4)(B)(i). 
  107  For a discussion of the representational imbalances between industry groups and public-
interest groups, see infra Part II.A. 
  108  E.O. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B). 
  109 See  2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 91. 
  110 GAO REPORT ON OIRA, supra note 31, at 54. 
  111 Id. 
  112 Id. at 54-55.  
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public about its meetings with outside parties stands in contrast to the more 
formal, APA-driven practices” of single-mission agencies.113   
In short, delay and secrecy have long been the hallmarks of OIRA 
review, and current OIRA practice has not gone far too ameliorate these 
problems.  Without an overhaul of the current executive review process, 
they will continue to nudge the regulatory state in an anti-regulatory 
direction. 
II. 
ZEALOTRY AND REGULATION 
The anti-regulatory contours of our existing executive review process 
were shaped by a fear that, if left unchecked, regulatory agencies would 
consistently regulate “too much” and drive American industry into the 
ground.114  As a result, OIRA concerns itself with ensuring that regulations 
are not unduly stringent, but pays scant attention to whether regulatory 
agencies have enacted regulations that are too lax or have failed to 
implement regulations that would provide net benefits.  The assumption 
about regulatory zealotry, allegedly bolstered time and again by studies 
demonstrating how badly some agency regulations fare under cost-benefit 
analysis, remains pervasive today, and underscores for many the need for 
an executive review process that brings to bear a healthy bias against 
regulations. 
But is the assumption justifiable?  The two most important empirical 
studies are equivocal; they demonstrate only that agency regulations 
routinely fail to maximize net benefits, a conclusion consistent both with 
widespread under-regulation (i.e., regulations should in general be made 
more stringent to maximize net benefits) and over-regulation (i.e., less-
stringent regulations would increase net benefits by reducing costs)..115  
Lacking solid empirical support, the following Section canvasses the 
various theoretical arguments advanced to support claims about the over-
zealousness of regulatory agencies.  These arguments fall into four 
 
  113 Id. at 55. 
  114 See  CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (“White House staff appeared for the 
most part to view regulatory agencies as victims of tunnel vision who were unconcerned about the 
costs of their activities and needed periodically to be restrained.”); Morrison, supra note 4, at 
1061 (“[T]here arose a feeling . . . that agencies had run amuck and . . . were administering their 
laws with no consideration of other interests or the economic effects of their decisions.”). Peter L. 
Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. 
L.  REV. 181, 188 (1986) (“[T]he orders embody a perception that the principal defect in 
administrative regulation is that it has been unduly intrusive and imposed substantial costs 
without accompanying benefit.”). 
  115 See Tammy Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED (R. Hahn ed. 1996); Robert W. 
Hahn,  Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s Numbers, in ROBERT  W.  HAHN, 
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (2000).  Also compare Richard 
Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003) (arguing that methodological 
flaws render these studies valueless), with Robert W. Hahn, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021 (2004) 
(arguing that “the solution to . . . is not to eliminate quantitative economic analysis, but to gain a 
deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, and to use it wisely”).  
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analytically distinct categories: (1) public choice and capture stories; (2) 
arguments about excessive regulatory caution, particularly at health-and-
safety agencies; (3) accounts of aggrandizing administrators bent on 
expanding their regulatory authority; (4) and stories about bureaucrats who 
are ideologically committed to pursuing their regulatory agendas. 
We conclude that these theories reflect implausible over-
generalizations about bureaucratic behavior, and form an altogether 
inappropriate conceptual foundation for a centralized regulatory review 
process.  To be clear, we do not argue that agencies never regulate too 
much.  Of course they do116—and in those circumstances, OIRA’s checking 
function serves an invaluable role.  Nor do we claim that agencies regulate 
“too little” more often than they regulate “too much.”  Our claim is more 
limited: that theories of agency over-regulation often rest on faulty 
premises and are in any event no more plausible than alternative theories 
suggesting that agencies will routinely under-regulate.  We therefore 
contend that OIRA’s de-regulatory mission is analytically unfounded, and 
that its central role in promoting rationality in the regulatory state is ripe for 
reconsideration. 
A.  Public Choice and Capture 
Sometime in the middle of last century, “capture theory” became the 
dominant paradigm of bureaucratic behavior.117  No longer persuaded by a 
traditional model that cast agencies in the role of an apolitical 
“transmission belt[s] for implementing legislative directives”118 nor a 
revised pluralist model that saw agencies as mini-legislatures that could 
equitably weigh interest group desires,119 theorists became enamored of an 
alternative account that came to be known as “regulatory capture,” which 
put regulated industries at the center of administrative decisionmaking.120 
In its classic form, capture theory involves three actors: an agency, the 
congressional committee that oversees that agency, and a powerful interest 
group.  In order to secure favorable regulations, the interest group (or so the 
story goes) will aggressively lobby committee-members and provide 
support, financial or otherwise, for the members’ reelection efforts.  Those 
committee-members will then pressure the agencies to enact favorable 
 
  116 See STEPHEN  BREYER,  BREAKING THE VICIOUS  CIRCLE:  TOWARD  EFFECTIVE  RISK 
REGULATION 24-27 (1993) (discussing facts of United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 
(1991)). 
  117 B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF 
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 18 (1994). 
  118  Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1675 (1975). 
  119 Id.  at 1675. 
  120 For one influential account from the legal literature, see Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 
498 (1952) (arguing that Interstate Commerce Commission had come to accept “‘the public 
interest’ and the ‘railroad interest’ as synonymous terms”).  For a discussion of the explosion of 
capture literature across academic disciplines from the fifties to the seventies, see WOOD  & 
WATERMAN, supra note 117, at 19.  
 
18 
regulations.  Because the rest of Congress will be largely oblivious to the 
activities of that committee and the agency, this “iron triangle” will 
inevitably cater to the interest group’s narrow desires to the detriment of 
the public interest.121 
Capture theory got a shot in the arm with the advent of Mancur 
Olson’s theory of group organization122 and George Stigler’s famous 
application of it to the legislative and regulatory process.123  T h e i r  
arguments were elegant: well-organized and tightly knit constituencies will 
inevitably have an organizational advantage over a dispersed public when it 
comes to providing “the two things that a [political] party needs: votes and 
resources.”124  The political branches will therefore be more attuned to the 
interests of those narrow interest-groups than to the desires of the general 
public.  It follows that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and 
is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”125 
Made thus respectable by the garb of economics, a capture account 
oriented around public choice theory caught the hearts and minds of the 
legal community.126  No longer seen as politically neutral dispensers of 
public goods, regulatory agencies were increasingly eyed with distrust as 
politically unaccountable incubators of narrow interest-group politicking.127 
Capture theory did not remain tethered to its roots in iron triangle 
theory, however.  Since the 1950s, more “subtle explanations” for the 
“industry orientation” of agencies have evolved.128  These explanations 
look to how agencies cooperate with interest groups in order to procure 
needed information, political support, and guidance; the more one-sided 
that information, support, and guidance, the more likely that agencies will 
act favorably towards the dominant interest group.129  These next-
generation theories, which sometimes fall under the rubric of interest-group 
“dominance,”130 gave new ammunition to those critics who, in a “dogmatic 
tone that reflects settled opinion,”131 argued that regulatory capture was a 
pervasive pathology of the administrative state. 
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1.  The Logic of Collective Action 
President Reagan’s regulatory team latched onto public-choice and 
capture theories, and more generally to this new tone of skepticism, to 
advocate for a new executive review process that would put a stop to the 
interest-grubbing that they claimed characterized the regulatory state and 
led to overzealous regulation.  Christopher DeMuth and Douglas Ginsburg, 
two former OIRA administrators under Reagan (and the latter now the 
Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit), are the most commonly cited adherents of 
the view that because “regulation tends to favor narrow, well-organized 
groups at the expense of the general public,” an executive review process 
should correct for over-zealous agency regulation.132 
We all know that a government agency . . . will invariably wish to spend 
“too much” on its goals.  An agency succeeds by accomplishing the 
goals Congress sets for it as thoroughly as possible—not by balancing 
its goals against other, equally worthy goals.  This fact of agency life 
provides the justification for a countervailing administrative constraint 
in the form of a central budget office.  Without some countervailing 
restraint, EPA and OSHA would “spend”—through regulations that 
spend society’s resources but do not appear in the federal government’s 
fiscal budget—”too much” on pollution control and workplace safety.  
This tendency is reinforced by the “public” participation in the 
rulemaking process, which as a practical matter is limited to those 
organized groups with the largest and most immediate stakes in the 
results.133 
This view takes as its core assumption that “narrow, well-organized 
groups” will, on the whole, “capture” agencies in order to pressure them to 
enact excessive regulation.  The villains of this story are environmental 
groups like the Sierra Club, labor unions like the Teamsters, and consumer 
advocacy groups like Public Citizen, all of whom are driven by their 
narrow ideologies and heedless of any costs to American industries.   
Through their superior organizational mettle, these ostensibly “public-
serving” groups prey on the sensibilities of warm-hearted but fuzzy-headed 
bureaucrats and congressmen to drive through regulations that are 
unnecessary, unwise, or simply too costly.134 
This story is wholly implausible.  Public choice theory—which 
DeMuth and Ginsburg invoke to support their call for a biased executive 
review process—in fact suggests precisely the opposite outcome, namely, 
that well-organized industry groups that stand to gain from a reduction in 
burdensome regulations will normally provoke an anti-regulatory response 
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from the administrative state. 
Mancur Olson’s theory of group organization provides that any 
group—like the Sierra Club—that aims to procure a public good for a large 
and diffuse bloc of people is quite unlikely to form.  Because any given 
individual will receive the benefits of the fruits of organizing whether or 
not she participates in group advocacy, that individual will have little or no 
incentive to devote her time and energy to joining.135  Olson thus argues 
that, “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in the 
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interests.”136  Furthermore, Olson’s theory suggests 
that large groups, in the unlikely event they do form, will face substantial 
difficulties in actually achieving the organization’s goals: “the larger the 
group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a 
collective good.”137 
On the flip side, Olson theorized that smaller groups—for example, 
industry groups with, as DeMuth and Ginsburg put it, the “largest and most 
immediate stakes in the results”138 of agency rulemaking—are more likely 
to organize because each individual member will have a much greater stake 
in securing the public good.  This conclusion flows from the premise that a 
smaller group “may very well be able to provide [itself] with a collective 
good simply because of the attraction of the collective good to the 
individual members.”139  Public-choice theory, then, suggests that the large 
“pro-regulatory” interest groups against which DeMuth and Ginsburg rail 
will be consistently outgunned in the legislative and regulatory process by 
smaller, better-organized and better-financed industry groups. 
And as an empirical matter, they are.  Take environmental regulation, 
for example.  Although protecting the environment consistently ranks 
among the most salient concerns of Americans,140 “pro-environment” 
groups are, as a rule, far larger and less well-funded than their industry 
counterparts.  Together, the three most prominent environmental groups in 
the country—the Sierra Club, the National Resources Defense Counsel, and 
the Environmental Defense Fund—counted over 2.15 million members141 
and total yearly operating revenues of $180 million,142 only a fraction of 
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which is spent on direct lobbying.  Compare that to the $130 million annual 
budget of the American Chemistry Council, a single trade association with 
a far narrower mission representing just 140 chemical companies.143  Or to 
the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, which counts fewer 
than 1,000 power cooperatives as members and yet boasts annual revenues 
of $189 million, $20.4 million of which is explicitly earmarked for 
“lobbying, regulatory, and communication programs.”  Or to the American 
Petroleum Institute, with revenues of more than $65 million in 2000144 and 
a membership roster of just 400.145 
This imbalance has not gone unnoticed.  A 1977 Senate Report 
concluded that regulated industries far outspent public-interest groups in 
lobbying agency decision-makers, with regulated industries sometimes 
lavishing anywhere between fifty and one hundred times as much as their 
public-interest counterparts.146  In one study on EPA, Cary Coglianese 
detailed how “[b]oth in rulemaking and in litigation, industry groups are 
the most common players,”147 and found that for a series of 28 hazardous 
waste regulations promulgated from 1988 to 1990, industry groups 
provided 67% of the comments while environmental groups provided just 
2%.148  His survey of filings in the D.C. Circuit over the same period 
showed that 91% of the challengers to EPA regulations were corporations 
or trade associations, while only 8% were environmental groups.149  A 
litany of studies all support the conclusion that “regulated parties enjoy 
much greater presence in agency decisionmaking than do public interest 
groups and other outside parties.”150  Taken together, these studies provide 
overwhelming empirical support for our theoretical conclusion that if any 
group has disproportionate access to the administrative state, it is industry. 
In addition, DeMuth and Ginsburg focus on health-and-safety 
agencies, but while many of the rules OIRA reviews have a health-and-
safety angle, many others do not.  As Steven Croley points out, roughly 
two-thirds of the economically significant rules that OIRA reviews come 
from EPA, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA); other major contributors are the Department of Commerce 
(DOC), the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Department of Labor 
(DOL).151  Only a handful of these agencies issue rules promoting health 
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and safety.  For example, OIRA recently completed review on 
economically significant regulations from USDA governing sugar 
reexport,152 from HHS on the electronic transmission of prescription 
information,153 and from HUD relating to its operating allocation 
formula.154  With respect to rules like these, which have no clear health-
and-safety angle and attract no obvious pro-regulatory constituency—yet 
which make up a substantial fraction of OIRA’s oversight duties—it is 
difficult to see precisely how DeMuth’s and Ginsburg’s critique applies at 
all. 
OIRA moreover reviews regulations from agencies that we would 
expect, if anything, to be captured by powerful anti-regulatory groups.  The 
Forest Service, for example, was once described by Justice Douglas as 
“notorious for its alignment with lumber companies.”155  FDA has recently 
been the subject of searing criticism because of its cozy relationship with 
the pharmaceutical industry.156  And DOE policy is closely aligned with the 
interests of the energy industry that it regulates.157  Yet OIRA reviews their 
regulations alongside those of the health-and-safety agencies,158 
unabashedly checking their alleged enthusiasm to impose large regulatory 
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costs—even though the industry-group domination of these agencies makes 
it singularly unlikely that they ever would impose inordinate costs.  If one 
purpose of OIRA review is to weed out pernicious interest-group influence, 
the existence of agencies like the Forest Service, FDA, and DOE—among 
others—should highlight how strange it is that OIRA devotes itself almost 
entirely to reducing regulatory costs. 
In sum, the DeMuth-Ginsburg paradigm of an agency captured by pro-
regulatory interests does not hold even when the benefits to be garnered by 
regulations are as salient as worker safety or environmental protection.  It is 
even less apposite to those regulatory activities that have no obvious 
health-and-safety implications or to regulations from agencies that, if 
anything, are likely to be captured by anti-regulatory interests. 
2.  Regulatory Capture and Cartelization 
Proponents of centralized review occasionally advance a slightly more 
plausible public choice story to justify a one-way OIRA review process.  
On this account, well-organized industry groups will work to “capture” 
administrative agencies and procure not deregulation, but new regulations 
that act as barriers to entry to new firms.159  Lloyd Cutler and David 
Johnson cited this demand-side model of regulatory outputs in 1975 to 
explain, in part, why “we regulate too much”160 and to justify their call for a 
centralized executive review process. 
Also known as “cartel theory,” this barriers-to-entry account 
effectively splits industry into two groups, existing firms and prospective 
firms, and posits that existing firms will work to secure regulations that will 
allow them to “become federal protectorates, living in the cozy world of 
cost-plus, safely protected from the ugly specters of competition, efficiency 
and innovation.”161  If the dominant pathology of the administrative state is 
that agencies will systematically over-regulate in order to impose barriers 
to entry within a particular industry, an executive review process that acts 
as a check on agency rulemaking authority could well be appropriate. 
This cartel story about bureaucratic behavior has only limited 
explanatory value, however, and has long ceased to carry much weight in 
the political science literature.  For starters, the theory’s baseline 
assumption is that industries will normally exercise a high degree of control 
over the agencies that regulate them—in other words, that they will 
“capture” those agencies.  Although adherents to capture theory take this as 
an article of faith, typically the “empirical analyses that [have] 
accompanied these theories relied heavily on historical commentaries and 
normative polemics, not on hard empirical evidence.”162 
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When tested in the real world, cartel theory has not fared well.163  
Richard Posner argued as early as 1974 that there are “significant 
weaknesses in both the theory and the empirical research that is alleged to 
support the theory.”164  Barry Weingast sharpened that critique in 1981: 
As we move into the 1980s, two seemingly incongruous trends in 
regulation are apparent.  First, the remarkable growth in regulation, 
particularly in the social and environmental areas, has led to 
unprecedented levels of federal intervention in the economy.   
Second . . . there exists a counter-trend of deregulation, particularly in 
the areas of direct economic regulation.165 
These two trends—the deregulation movement begun in the 1970s, 
and the “movement away from narrow industry regulation (i.e., airlines, 
trucking, telecommunications, and so on) and toward economy-wide social 
regulation (i.e., health, safety, environmental)”166—together “challenged 
one of the theory’s basic premises, namely, that regulatory agencies serve 
the interests of the regulated clientele, not the public interest.”167  
Even those industries that do seek barriers to entry will be plagued by 
collective action problems.  Industries are not normally homogenous; firms 
within the industry may have different capacities to cope with new entrants 
and may be more or less willing to settle on an agenda for the industry 
group as a whole.  Many industries are moreover quite large, raising the 
costs of coordination and giving individual firms an incentive to free-ride 
on the efforts of other firms to procure those barriers.168  It is therefore by 
no means assured that even industries that would benefit from cartelization 
would be able to form the coalition groups necessary to push for the 
necessary regulation. 
Finally, even if industry groups as a general rule did  procure 
regulations that erected barriers to entry, it simply does not follow that the 
resulting regulations would be too stringent.  Industries might procure 
regulations that acted as effective barriers to entry but which were 
nevertheless, overall, too lax in cost-benefit terms.  To illustrate this point, 
imagine a case under the Clean Air Act in which existing polluters 
procured an emissions regulation that imposed costly pollution controls on 
any new plant but that exempted existing plants.  This regulation would act 
as an effective barrier to entry even if the regulation permitted inefficiently 
high levels of pollution from new and old sources combined.  Existing 
firms will care only that the regulation discriminates sufficiently in favor of 
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existing firms so as to give that subset of the industry a competitive edge; it 
will be agnostic, however, as to the costs and benefits of the regulation it 
procures.  Put another way, it does not follow from a simple diagnosis of 
this pathology that agencies will typically regulate over-zealously. 
In short, “[n]o mechanistic theory of capture can do justice to what in 
fact happen[s]” in governmental agencies.169  Fears of over-regulation 
premised on an overly simplistic vision of regulatory capture thus fail to 
justify an assymetrical OIRA review process. 
B.  Agency Empire-Building 
Another strand in the literature has advanced an alternative account 
that purportedly demonstrates an administrative proclivity for over-zealous 
regulation and hence justifies an anti-regulatory executive review process.  
William Niskanen, who chaired Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers 
and worked as an assistant director at OIRA for two years, is the foremost 
expositor of the view that high-level agency administrators are utility 
maximizers bent on increasing the size of their agencies by demanding 
ever-larger budgets from the legislature.  On Niskanen’s view, these larger 
budgets correlate positively with agencies that are heedless of imposing 
ever-larger costs on private actors—in essence, that they regulate “too 
much.” 
Niskanen argues that empire-building administrators with 
informational monopolies on the real costs of regulatory outputs can 
generally leverage their informational advantage to hoodwink the 
legislature into providing an inefficiently large budget.170  The implication 
of this “imperial model” of bureaucratic behavior is that the increased 
budgetary input will, in turn, result in a sub-optimally high level of 
regulatory output.171  If the model is accurate, then an OIRA process that 
puts a thumb on the scale against regulation might check that behavior and 
lead to more rational regulation.  John Graham has endorsed a version of 
the Niskanean claim, comparing his office’s review of regulations to 
OMB’s review of agencies’ budget requests: “regulatory expenditures, 
while off budget, require fiscal restraint for the same reasons that the size 
of public budgets need to be restrained.”172 
As Daryl Levinson has convincingly argued, however, Niskanen’s 
imperial model of bureaucratic behavior is deeply flawed.173  In his 
groundbreaking work refuting the widely accepted account of 
governmental empire-building, Levinson marshals the political science 
literature to refute two of Niskanen’s more problematic assumptions.  He 
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first attacks Niskanen’s blanket assumption that agency administrators will 
seek to increase the size of their agencies’ budgets.  Citing to the work of 
social scientists, Levinson insists as an initial matter that “[e]ven if most 
bureaucrats were primarily interested in lining their own pockets, the 
relationship between a larger agency budget and higher salaries or cushier 
working conditions is empirically tenuous.”174  (As the political scientist 
James Q. Wilson once trenchantly noted, “One wonders why Niskanen 
thinks bureaucrats are so desirous of maximizing their budgets if they can 
enjoy so few of the fruits.”175)  More fundamentally, however, Levinson 
argues that even if we were to accept that bureaucrats were simple utility 
maximizers, it is child’s play to identify different and “more charitabl[e]” 
assumptions about what bureaucrats maximize—say, “protecting the 
environment, enforcing civil rights, educating children, and the like.”176 
Levinson then takes aim at Niskanen’s conclusion that agencies will 
run roughshod over the political branches in pursuing their budget-
maximizing proclivities.  Turning to a generation of political science 
literature that emphasizes the variety of ways in which Congress177 and the 
President178 exert considerable influence over administrative agencies, 
Levinson notes that “[t]he simple lesson . . . is that whatever other interests 
bureaucrats might have they will be highly responsive to the political 
pressures brought to bear by their elected principals and others.”179 
If Niskanen’s aggrandizing theory were accurate, moreover, it would 
suggest that a regulatory agency would adopt as many standards as it could 
justify in order to command an ever-more inflated budget to implement and 
enforce those standards.  On this view, EPA would be enthusiastic about 
regulating as many different pollutants as possible; after all, each new 
listing would require new scientific studies, new sets of standards, and new 
enforcement mechanisms—all of which Congress would have to fund. 
EPA’s experience, however, has been just the opposite. For example, 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to set emissions standards for 
“hazardous air pollutants” that are not criteria pollutants,180 and mandates 
that the EPA “periodically review the list” of hazardous air pollutants and 
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add new compounds which may present health risks.181  “In light of the 
regulatory implications of the listing decision,” however, “the EPA has 
been extremely careful to study a pollutant extensively before listing it.”182  
In part because of EPA’s caution, in the first two decades of the CAA’s 
existence, EPA added only seven hazardous air pollutants to the list.183  
EPA’s manifest reluctance to add new pollutants led to a congressional 
rebuke in the 1990 amendment of the CAA when Congress laboriously 
listed 189 air pollutants that it required EPA to treat as hazardous.184  If 
EPA had been concerned with regulating in order to justify larger 
congressional outlays, its unwillingness to classify additional pollutants 
would be inexplicable.  Niskanen’s theory is not simply wrong about the 
EPA—it in fact predicts precisely the opposite of what actually occurred at 
the agency. 
Even if Niskanen’s account were accurate, moreover, it would suggest 
that regulatory agencies would enact lots of standards—but not that the 
standards would be excessively stringent.  For the purposes of inflating 
their budgets, agencies would focus on the number of regulations they 
could implement and enforce, but would be agnostic as to the relative 
stringency of those regulations.  Why should EPA care whether a NAAQS 
holds the level of a particular pollutant to one part per million or one 
hundred parts per million?  Fully consistent with the Niskanean story, one 
could well imagine an ever-expanding regulatory regime that nevertheless 
routinely failed to maximize net benefits out of a desire to minimize 
regulatory costs. 
Indeed, a budget-maximizing agency might take precisely such a tack 
to blunt the political opposition that might otherwise accompany costly 
regulatory regimes.  Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst detail one such case in 
their analysis of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA).185  Mashaw and Harfst argue that NHTSA, buckling under 
pressure from Congress and the threat of judicial review, abandoned its 
ambitious initial commitment to enacting meaningful safety regulations 
sometimes in the mid-1970s and refocused its mission on vehicle recalls 
that had “no known effects on vehicle safety.”186  The decline in rule 
promulgation accompanied a steep drop in the costs imposed on 
automobile manufacturers,187 even though Mashaw and Harfst report that 
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NHTSA never implemented dozens of regulations that offer substantially 
more benefits than costs.188 
But even as NHTSA abnegated much of its responsibility to ensure 
motor vehicle safety during the late 1970s, “Congress happily funded the 
agency’s recall efforts.”189  The agency’s staff was its largest in history 
during that period, topping 900, and NHTSA’s budget was at its inflation-
adjusted peak.190  This budgetary largesse came accompanied with 
restrictions on the uses to which NHTSA could put the funds, however, and 
Congress funneled money to promote the recall-oriented mission even as it 
slashed its research and rulemaking budgets.191  The message from 
Congress was clear: NHTSA’s primary job was to recall cars, not to enact 
proven safety regulations.192 
On the Niskanean view, NHTSA’s increased budget should have 
correlated with more stringent regulations and higher industry costs.  In this 
case, however, the increased budget correlated precisely with less stringent 
regulations and less stringent enforcement.  This is arguably predictable: 
members of Congress may be all too happy to take credit for aggressively 
funding an ostensibly public-regarding agency even as the agency fails to 
enact regulations that impose costs on favored constituents.  But it surely 
cuts hard against a simple Niskanean vision of the administrative state. 
C.  Excessive Regulatory Caution 
DeMuth and Ginsburg offer another justification for an OIRA review 
process that operates as a one-way ratchet against excessively stringent 
regulation: “regulation tends to be excessively cautious (forcing 
investments in risk reduction far in excess of the value that individuals 
place on avoiding the risks involved).”193  On this view, OIRA is seen as a 
level-headed re-calibrator of costs and benefits to assure that the regulatory 
state does not impose excessive costs on industry.  But why precisely are 
agencies so risk-averse?  Although DeMuth and Ginsburg assert it as fact, 
they offer little discussion.  Still, the claim is facially plausible for at least 
three reasons—none of which are ultimately satisfactory. 
First, agencies normally err on the side of safety when operating under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty.  Numerous authors have detailed the 
“compounded conservatism” of agency risk assessments that results from 
numerous protective assumptions about risks.194  Because agency risk 
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assessments are themselves premised on “quasi-policy judgments that 
reflect values about how protective or conservative they should be,”195 
perhaps (the argument goes) OIRA should make another quasi-policy 
judgment and adjust the agencies’ numbers downwards to reflect more 
“realistic” risk assessments.  Apparently OIRA has embraced this view: its 
most recent circular detailing how agencies should carry out cost-benefit 
analyses  quite explicitly states that “conservative assumptions and defaults 
(whether motivated by science policy or precautionary instincts), will be 
incompatible with benefit analyses as they will result in benefit estimates 
that exceed the expected value.”196 
But an effective centralized review procedure designed to curtail 
regulations based on overly cautious risk assessments would look very 
different from what is currently in place.  Although OIRA could (and, as 
we explain later, should197) provide guidelines about what constitutes an 
appropriate level of regulatory caution, it currently says very little about 
how agencies should handle the uncertainty that is part and parcel of 
thoughtful risk assessments.198  To be sure, OIRA has recently taken small 
steps to standardize risk assessments—for example, it requires agencies to 
use 95% upper-confidence limits in certain types of risk assessments199—
but it remains the case that overseeing the uncertainty in risk assessments is 
largely outside its purview. 
Also, many of the regulations that OIRA reviews come from agencies’ 
statutory mandates to err on the side of caution.200  For example, virtually 
all of the statutes that EPA administers require the agency to adopt a 
“margin of safety” when it regulates a particular risk201—and OIRA 
reviews more rules from EPA than from any other agency.202  S i m i l a r  
statutory requirements appear in the regulatory statutes of other agencies; 
for example, OSHA must promulgate regulations to ensure that “no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity.”203  It would flout Congress for OIRA to combat “conservative” 
assumptions required by statute. 
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The second reason to perhaps be concerned about excessive regulatory 
caution is that, as Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have argued, 
legislatures normally do not respond to individual agency actions (which in 
any case are too numerous to monitor effectively), but rather to “fire 
alarms” that go off when constituencies bring particular agency actions to 
their attention.204  Agencies will naturally wish to avoid setting off fire 
alarms that focus unwanted congressional attention on their activities.   
They may thus adopt conservative and over-protective policies in order to 
ensure that they cannot be accused of failing to protect the public 
adequately.  On this view, FDA will be overly cautious in its drug-approval 
process in order to avoid high-profile public relations disasters over the 
approval of drugs that turn out to be unsafe,205 and EPA will force 
industries to spend enormous amounts of money to ensure that Superfund 
sites are so clean that no one can accuse it insensitivity to cancer risks. 
The assumption, however, that fire alarms will always—or even 
usually—be set off by pro-regulatory groups is implausible.  For the same 
reasons that well-funded, well-organized industry groups have an 
advantage over public-interest groups in “capturing” regulatory agencies, 
industry will have an advantage in monitoring agencies and in setting off 
these alarms when their interests are threatened.206  If industry groups take 
their grievances to Congress, they should have a similar resource advantage 
in wooing legislators. 
Industry’s advantage in setting off fire alarms is likely to be even 
more pronounced in health and safety arena because many (if not most) of 
the public health consequences of agency action will be delayed and 
difficult to trace.  An individual who, for example, is exposed to a 
carcinogen that an agency should have regulated, or regulated more 
stringently, is likely to be wholly unaware either of her exposure or of her 
slightly increased risk of cancer.  Even if she does develop cancer—usually 
years or decades later—she will almost certainly not link her cancer to the 
exposure.  And even if she does link it to the exposure, the likelihood that 
she will accurately blame the agency for its lack of regulatory zeal and 
therefore ring fire alarms to call the agency to task (assuming that the 
agency has not yet regulated the substance, or even that the agency still 
exists) is more remote still. 
In contrast, a regulation’s economic cost is clear and immediate.   
Industry will therefore ring every fire alarm at its disposal as soon as it 
catches wind of an adverse regulation.  The concreteness of the economic 
harms that industries face will give them a distinct advantage over groups 
arguing, normally in the face of substantial scientific uncertainty, that the 
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public-health consequences of regulatory inaction are profound. 
We do not want to overdraw this story.  Public-interest groups will of 
course bring some latent health risks to the attention of regulators and 
Congress, and they have been and will continue to be successful on 
occasion.  And industry groups may pull fire alarms to no avail.  But, far 
from supporting a conclusion of regulatory over-zealousness, the fire alarm 
story normally cuts in the direction of under-regulation. 
The third reason that agencies might be overly cautious is that, as 
Stephen Breyer and others have noted, public perceptions of risk can differ 
materially from expert assessments.  Thus, people tend to give greater 
prominence to unusual risks than to everyday risks, to have a greater moral 
obligation towards family members and friends than to strangers, to distrust 
experts, to be reluctant to change their minds, and to have difficulty 
understanding the mathematical probabilities involving risk.207  On this 
account, agencies, responding to public paranoia, will zealously work to 
avert certain highly prominent risks, thereby imposing greater costs on 
industry than would be justified on strict cost-benefit grounds.  The 
paradigm case on this view is nuclear power, which experts regard as 
peculiarly safe and yet which the public greatly distrusts.208  A biased 
OIRA review process that could temper regulatory responses to 
unwarranted public fears might therefore be appropriate. 
Underlying this story, however, is an unsubstantiated assumption that 
heuristics only serve to magnify public fears of highly prominent risks.  But 
heuristics also serve to dampen fears about risks that perhaps ought to be 
regulated more stringently.  Although people are generally not concerned 
about the risks of indoor radon, for example, it is abundantly clear to 
experts that they should be.209  If public perceptions do correlate with 
agency regulations—and there is some reason to believe that they do210—
then we would expect that a lack of public pressure would correlate with a 
lack of agency regulation.  Hence radon regulation is an area “of relatively 
high risk but low EPA effort.”211  A centralized review process that ensures 
that agencies are not shirking their duties to regulate low-salience risks is 
every bit as appropriate as OIRA review to ensure that agencies do not 
over-zealously enact regulations that cater to public fears.  Asymmetrically 
reviewing regulations only for perceived over-zealousness in an effort to 
adjust for irrational heuristics is consequently unjustifiable. 
D.  Mission Identification and “Going Native” 
Perhaps the fear of regulatory overzealousness reflects a different 
unarticulated stereotype about bureaucratic behavior.  Perhaps “a 
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government agency  .  .  . will invariably wish to spend ‘too much’ on its 
goals” not because of public-choice theory, or because of some misguided 
adherence to the precautionary principle, but simply because it is the nature 
of regulators to regulate.  On this view, it would be appropriate for OIRA 
to check the pro-regulatory impulses of well-intentioned but misguided 
governmental employees. 
1.  Mission Identification 
This theory can be articulated most convincingly with reference to a 
theory of mission identification, whereby government administrators will 
take positions within an agency because of an ideological identification 
with that agency’s mission.212  Thus ardent environmentalists will apply to 
work at the EPA; labor supporters will go to OSHA; and consumer-
protection advocates will seek refuge at the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC).  The unabashedly “pro-regulation” ideologies of 
those civil servants (so the story goes) will lead to ever-broader and more-
intrusive regulations.  Although there is no systematic empirical support for 
the view that pro-regulatory ideology biases agency outputs, neither is there 
evidence to the contrary213—so commentators rely on proxies, pointing to 
studies showing that a large majority of civil servants self-identify as 
Democrats.214 
The main virtues of this ideology story are its simplicity, the difficulty 
of disproving it, and its adaptability.  Any adverse regulatory decision can 
be explained away as the result of bureaucratic bias, and such complaints 
are likely to be taken quite seriously by both politicians and the public.215  
But the account does not stand up to serious scrutiny.  To begin with, it is 
premised on the implausible assumption that ideology is the dominant 
motivator of agency bureaucrats.  As Wilson has argued, however, the 
psychological literature undercuts the view that ideology or beliefs or 
attitudes explain much about how bureaucrats in the trenches actually 
operate.216  This is only natural: the factors that motivate bureaucrats on a 
day-to-day basis are not normally so abstract as “ideology,” but are more 
often the mundane (and personally more salient) concerns relating to career 
advancement, producing a quality work product, and abiding by 
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professional and ethical norms.  “When we realize that attitudes must 
compete with incentives for influence over our behavior, it is not surprising 
that attitudes often lose out to the rewards we seek or the penalties we try to 
avoid.”217  Ideology enters, if at all, on the margins. 
Moreover, career civil servants presumably understand that the quality 
and efficacy of whatever regulations they implement will turn on the level 
of cooperation they receive, both pre- and post-implementation, from the 
regulated industry—and that they are likely to lose political allies rapidly if 
they are seen as imposing improvidently high costs.  For this reason, an 
ardent environmentalist might still be quite careful to strike a fair balance 
between costs and benefits; her ideological leanings may influence, but are 
unlikely to dictate, her eventual policy decision. 
Even assuming the ideology of career civil servants plays a powerful 
role in most government agencies, it is not the case that this would 
inevitably lead to over-regulation.  Agency  bureaucrats might also have 
ideological proclivities towards less stringent regulations; civil servants at 
the Forest Service or DOE might plausibly have such leanings.218  Other 
agencies might be staffed by bureaucrats whose ideological alignment will 
play little role in its activities—”[t]here is no liberal or conservative way to 
deliver the mail or issue a driver’s license.”219  On top of that, we can safely 
predict that ideologically driven agencies will come into conflict with other 
ideologically driven agencies—as would happen if, for instance, HUD 
zealously pursued its housing goals while giving short shrift to the 
environmental consequences.220  It is far from obvious that the outcome of 
these conflicts will result in regulation that is systematically too stringent. 
Again, we do not want to overstate our claim.  It is undoubtedly true 
that most of EPA’s employees identify strongly with the environmental 
mission of the agency, and the same can be said of many of the health-and-
safety agencies that impose large costs on the private sector.  But the 
ideological leanings of bureaucrats are likely to be tempered by 
professional norms and agency culture, and it is not the case (as some 
critics appear to assume) that their political beliefs will translate cleanly 
into regulatory policy. 
2.  “Going Native”: Two Types of Principal-Agent Problems 
This view of regulatory policymaking is moreover vulnerable to the 
citique that, whatever the ideology of an agency’s staff, the political 
commitment of the agency’s administrator will exert far more influence 
over agency outputs.  Numerous studies have canvassed how presidents 
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exert considerable power over agency action through their power to appoint 
loyalists to influential administrative posts.221  The influence of political 
appointees is why President Reagan, “perhaps more successfully than any 
other modern President,” flexed his appointment power “to staff the 
agencies with officials remarkable for their personal loyalty and ideological 
commitment, who would subscribe to his (obligingly clear) policy agenda 
even in the face of competing bureaucratic pressures”222  Clinton’s well-
documented wrangling of the administrative apparatus for his own 
purposes223 lends further support to the view that long-term Washington 
bureaucrats don’t drive regulatory policy—their political masters do. 
For the ideology story to ring true, then, some explanation needs to be 
given for why politically appointed administrators will fall victim to the 
pro-regulatory proclivities of their civil-servant employees.  Ready at hand 
is another common story.  Thus, E. Donald Elliott describes that, “in most 
administrations, after a few years, the OIRA and White House ‘managers’ 
generally come to hold in contempt their erstwhile colleagues in the 
agencies, believing they have ‘gone native’ and adopted the characteristic 
values of their agencies.”224  Similarly, Bruce Ackerman points to the 
“great danger” that the president’s appointees will “succumb to the 
pressures of the entrenched ideologues to sustain the preexisting mission of 
the agency even when it deviates from ‘the administration’s agenda.”225 
This argument breaks down into a set of two principal-agent problems.  
The first—and weaker—of these problems assumes that the appointee’s 
policy preferences of will, over time, diverge from the policy preferences 
of the President.  This view fails to acknowledge, however, that any 
disagreements between the President and his appointee are likely to arise 
not because of a divergence in preferences, but because an agency 
administrator will operate under a set of constraints that the executive is 
likely to be only dimly aware of.226  A competent administrator, for 
example, may “push back” on certain executive proposals because she 
understands the difficulty of implementing the proposal with her agency’s 
current level of resources.  Or she may think that the proposal will 
inadvertently produce fierce resistance from groups that the administration 
can ill afford to alienate.  Or she may disagree with the administration in 
light of her greater knowledge of her regulatory arena. 
But it would be quite surprising if the disagreement between the 
President and his political appointee was primarily ideological.  Indeed, 
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agency administrators are political operatives who are entrusted with, and 
rewarded for, advancing the administration’s agenda.  Even when closeted 
within agencies staffed by civil servants with radically different ideological 
agendas, and even when hostage to information fed to them by civil 
servants with a different political or ideological persuasion, political 
appointees are quite mindful that they will not be rewarded for betraying 
that trust. 
A second, and more troubling, principal-agent problem can arise 
between the heads of agencies and their employees.  Bureaucracies are not 
finely tuned machines that can easily be re-directed from the top down, and 
administrators will invariably struggle to shift agency culture in the 
direction of the President’s agenda.227  Loyal administrators may be unable 
to implement that agenda because they must rely on employees with 
divergent ideological and political agendas.228  Those administrators will 
moreover only have a rough sense of the work that their subordinates are 
doing; in lower-profile cases, at least, staffers can pursue their own agendas 
at the expense of the administration’s.  Ackerman colorfully characterizes 
this tension as “the ongoing struggle between the president’s loyalists at the 
center and the entrenched ideological entrepreneurs in the sprawling 
periphery,”229 and it is undoubtedly a serious problem for administrators. 
This account, however, should not be overdrawn.  As noted above, it 
runs counter to voluminous empirical support for the position that political 
appointees quite effectively shape outputs at regulatory agencies.230  
Although that data does not tell us whether administrators would have been 
more successful at shaping administrative outputs if they faced a less 
recalcitrant bureaucracy, it at the very least suggests that civil servants’ 
policy preferences do not invariably (or even usually) dictate regulatory 
policy.  Moreover, while administrators will receive much of their 
information from their staff, they need not rely wholly on that information.  
A political appointee has many avenues to procure necessary information 
from groups with an incentive to influence her ultimate decision.  Over the 
course of an important rulemaking, for example, administrators will receive 
information from industry sources, advocacy groups, and politicians with 
an interest in the regulation at hand.  Moreover, even if it were the case that 
the political appointee were wholly reliant on her staff, an agency staff will 
not invariably have pro-regulatory proclivities.  While it may be the case 
that some agency staffers will lean in a pro-regulatory direction, there may 
well be others—perhaps at DOE, or the Forest Service—who lean in an 
anti-regulatory direction.231 
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In sum, no simplistic account of bureaucratic behavior—whether 
based on public-choice pressures, empire-building administrators, over-
cautious risk managers, or zealous bureaucrats—justifies the conclusion 
that agencies will always, or even usually, regulate “too much.”  This is 
hardly a surprise: “Government agencies are at least as complex and hard 
to understand as an exotic and distant native culture that a traveler has 
entered for the first time.”232  Making a caricature of government agencies 
and the civil servants who work there to justify a review process that puts 
its thumb on the scales against regulation is wrong-headed and will, 
predictably, lead to socially undesirable results. 
III. 
UNDERSTANDING OIRA 
In this Section, we move away from analyzing the pathologies of 
regulatory agencies and turn our turn our attention to OIRA itself.  In 
particular, we challenge the view that OIRA, unlike these agencies, is a 
neutral decisionmaker that can accurately assess costs and benefits in an 
unbiased way.  Thus, the role of OIRA in the administrative state cannot be 
justified by reference to the checking function—the one-way ratchet 
against regulation—that has been its hallmark since its inception. 
A.  The Conventional Account 
The most prevalent argument in the literature is that OIRA can check 
whatever public-choice infirmities exist because it is firmly under the 
control of a nationally accountable chief executive who is less sensitive to 
the kinds of parochial preferences that dominate single-mission agencies.233  
The basic intuition is that it costs more to capture the president than it does 
a single-mission agency: the President, because he must satisfy a wide 
array of stakeholders, requires a sufficiently large temptation to cater to one 
group’s narrow interests at the expense of other groups or the public.  An 
agency, in contrast, is more narrowly responsive and can be effectively 
bought off by showering fewer resources on a few important legislators and 
bureaucrats.234  The high costs of presidential capture, reason OIRA’s 
advocates, will stymie interest-group efforts to exert undue influence on an 
agency within the Executive Office of the President.235  As a consequence, 
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OIRA can rely on its relative insulation from the factional politicking that 
characterizes single-mission agencies to check bureaucratic capture. 
Public-choice theory, however, does not provide support for this 
conclusion.  As an initial matter, it would be naïve to assume that the 
president is immune to public-choice pressures.  He is not.  Like any 
elected official, the president will be particularly attentive to those groups 
who can provide him with the resources, support, or the votes to win 
elections or promote his political agenda.236  This is hardly controversial: 
DeMuth and Ginsburg note that “presidents and legislatures are themselves 
vulnerable to pressure from politically influential groups.”237  T h e  t w o  
former OIRA administrators nevertheless argue that “the rulemaking 
process—operating in relative obscurity from public view but lavishly 
attended by interest groups—is even more vulnerable.”238 
But why should this be so?  Public-choice theory predicts that most 
policy issues—particularly low-salience regulatory issues—will garner 
little public attention because members of a diffuse public do not have a 
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a decision to justify forming 
lobbying groups.239  Whether the President or an agency resolves the issue 
is not at all relevant to this Olsonian calculus.  Put another way, the parties 
that are willing and able to bid effectively for regulatory outputs at the 
agency level will be as eager to bid for those same outputs at the 
presidential level; they will not be deterred simply because the President 
sits atop the regulatory hierarchy on a flow-chart.240 
Standard public-choice accounts moreover hold that success in the 
legislative process goes to the highest bidder, where “bidding” is taken as a 
shorthand for the multiplicity of ways (both overt and covert) that interest 
groups shape outputs.241  Whether the President or an agency makes the 
ultimate decision, well-financed industry groups will still be in a relatively 
better position than their more diffuse public interest counterparts to 
provide the relevant governmental actors with needed resources and 
support.  As a consequence, in the face of lingering public apathy, public-
choice theory would suggest that both the President and regulatory 
agencies will be attentive to narrow interests so long as other, better-
financed interest groups do not have cross-cutting priorities. 
Unsurprisingly, the available evidence supports the view that the mix 
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of participants active in the OIRA review process heavily favors industry, 
suggesting that OIRA fares little better than single-mission agencies at 
hearing from all affected parties.242  Erik Olson reported as early as 1984 
that “comments from industry come pouring into OMB offices  .  .  . 
[reflecting] the lobbying power of the parties involved in rulemaking,” and 
that the available evidence provided solid support for the claim that OIRA 
was a “conduit” for industry views.243  This imbalance persists two decades 
later: in its 2003 report on OIRA, the GAO collected hard data and found 
that the outside parties who contacted OIRA were “most commonly 
representatives of regulated entities.”244  Croley’s analysis of OIRA’s 
records covering the period from 1993-2000 makes a similar finding—
namely, that fully 56% of the meetings that OIRA held to discuss proposed 
or final agency rulemakings involved only “narrow interests” (i.e., industry 
groups), as compared to only 10% that involved only “broad interests” (i.e., 
non-profit public-interest groups).  (Another 28% of the meetings involved 
both narrow and broad interests in some capacity, but it is impossible to 
disaggregate the relative representation of broad and narrow interest groups 
at those meetings.245)  These ratios are roughly comparable to the 
participation rates of industry and public-interest groups at EPA that we 
discussed in Part II—recall, for example, Coglianese’s finding that 67% of 
the comments received on a series of hazardous waste regulations came 
from private industry, while only 2% came from public-interest groups.246 
Drawing firm conclusions about influence from participation rates is 
tricky,247 but GAO’s data are suggestive: of the twenty-five rules that OIRA 
“significantly affected” in 2002, outside parties commented on eleven of 
them—and for seven of those eleven rules, “at least some of the actions 
that OIRA recommended were similar to those suggested” by the industry 
groups.248  Similarly, Croley documented a correlation between rules that 
prompted meetings at OIRA and rules that changed during the OIRA 
review process.  This correlation suggests that “a meeting reflects some 
underlying [political] dynamic that leads to a change in a rule,” a view that 
“is consistent with fears that White House review constitutes a forum for 
interest groups who object to aspect of a rule to enlist the White House to 
change it.”249 
In sum, the replication of lopsided interest-group participation at 
OIRA suggests that OIRA’s proximity to the President does not by itself 
smooth public-choices imbalances in the regulatory process.  The President 
is himself susceptible to his own set of public-choice pressures, and there is 
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no reason to believe that his involvement corrects public choice pathologies 
at the agency level. 
B.  OIRA Is Not the President 
Even if we accept the premise that the President will is largely 
immune to public-choice pressures, however, OIRA is not the President.250  
OIRA is simply an agency within the executive branch, and this agency, 
like other agencies, will face public-choice pressures.251 
To begin with, any “notion of national political accountability needs to 
be tempered by the reality that the president is generally not the person 
doing the overseeing.”252  The White House has limited resources to expend 
on regulatory oversight—including OIRA oversight—and only the most 
salient or politically consequential regulations will invite explicit White 
House attention.253  As a consequence, OIRA will in general have free rein 
to manage the regulatory state without the kind of robust White House 
oversight that advocates like DeMuth and Ginsburg claim will blunt the 
effect of public-choice imbalances. 
Recognizing this problem, Dean Kagan hedges her conclusion about 
the benefits of presidential control over agency rulemaking with an 
important caveat that is highly relevant to OIRA review: “[A]t least to the 
extent that presidential involvement in rulemaking has a substantial public 
dimension, the President’s concern for maintaining the support of a national 
constituency, a concern not shared by any agency, should curb the extent to 
which he attends only to narrow interests.”254  But the whole point of 
regulatory review at OIRA is that rulemaking does not generally have a 
substantial public dimension—if it did, then OIRA’s role as a 
counterweight to public-choice pathologies would be superfluous. 
It is true that political appointees at OIRA will share the President’s 
general outlook towards regulation, and can in any event “get the message” 
about the White House’s priorities over time, reducing the need for overt 
White House monitoring.  Perhaps this explains why DeMuth and Ginsburg 
(among others) believe that OIRA will normally be better-insulated than 
single-mission agencies from public-choice pressures.  But political 
appointees at single-mission agencies similarly share the president’s 
agenda, and are equally capable of “getting the message” about the White 
House’s priorities.  Because OIRA’s relationship to the White House is not 
unique, the assumption is that agencies will be routinely plagued by 
regulatory capture, but that OIRA will never be, is not very plausible.255 
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For at least two reasons, OIRA may have particular susceptibilities to 
public-choice pressures.  First, OIRA is not covered by the APA.256  The 
absence of judicial review makes it more difficult for aggrieved groups 
with disproportionately little influence over political or regulatory 
processes to challenge OIRA’s actions.257  Indeed, transferring regulatory 
authority to an APA-insulated agency operates as a back-door way to cut 
the federal judiciary out of an increasingly important stage of the 
rulemaking process.258  The predictable result is that OIRA is far less 
careful than the regulatory agencies in documenting its meetings with 
interested parties, leaving it open to the charge that it devotes undue 
attention to the complaints of regulated entities.259  I n  s h o r t ,  O I R A ’ s  
exemption from the APA suggests it is poorly designed to correct for 
public-choice imbalances. 
Second, OIRA has a long and well-documented history of secrecy.260  
Although sustained criticism in the 1980’s led to reforms that made the 
review process more transparent,261 it remains remarkably difficult today 
for outsiders to get a strong grasp of what OIRA review entails.262  
Expressing uncharacteristic frustration with OIRA, GAO explained that 
“difficulties [its staff] experienced during [its] review [in 2003] clearly 
demonstrated that OIRA’s reviews are not always transparent to the 
public.”263 
For example, neither OIRA nor the agencies are required to disclose 
why rules are withdrawn from review, and the descriptions that OIRA 
discloses about its contacts with outside parties is often not very helpful. 
In particular, OIRA representatives said neither they nor the rulemaking 
agencies are required to disclose the changes made to rules while they 
are under informal review—the period in which OIRA said it can have 
its greatest effect.264 
Croley’s review of OIRA records was similarly hamstrung by 
transparency problems.  He examined OIRA’s files in an effort to 
determine whether a rule passed through OIRA review without change or 
whether those rules were issued “consistent with change,” a designation 
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given to a rule that was changed at some point of the OIRA review 
process.265  Although that terse phrase, “consistent with change,” is the only 
information that the public record reveals about the role that OIRA played 
in the review process, it could cover anything from editorial changes in the 
form of the rule to important substantive shifts in regulatory policy.266  The 
increasing frequency of informal pre-proposal agency-OIRA negotiations 
only heightens OIRA’s unseen effect on regulatory decision-making.267  
Yet OIRA steadfastly refuses to institute any transparency reforms, 
claiming (with some gall) that GAO’s report “had not demonstrated the 
need or desirability of changing the agency’s ‘unprecedented’ level of 
transparency.”268  It is frankly difficult to understand how an agency   
committed to operating in the shadows could be well-positioned to 
minimize public-choice pathologies. 
C.  Experience with Presidential Review 
Experience with presidential review of agency rulemaking suggests 
that fears that OIRA is prone to industry-group domination are not 
academic.  The Council on Competitiveness offers one egregious and high-
profile example of industry-group capture of an entity exercising 
presidential oversight over agency rulemakings, and it is by no means the 
only example.  The Council came to prominence in 1989 when Congress 
refused to reauthorize funding for OIRA or confirm the first President 
Bush’s nominee to head the agency.269  During a hiatus in robust OIRA 
review, the Council “stepped in to fill the political void and to set the tone 
of regulatory review.”270  Although separate from OIRA and not part of the 
regular channels of presidential review of rulemaking, the Council 
arrogated to itself increasing oversight power over controversial and costly 
regulations.271 
Chaired by then-Vice President Dan Quayle, “a self-proclaimed 
‘zealot when it comes to deregulation,’”272 the Council was sharply critical 
of any regulation and deeply solicitous of vested business interests.273  
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Staffed by free-market enthusiasts with an open contempt for regulatory 
agencies (the Council’s executive director, Allan Hubbard, asserted that 
policy should not be set by “some green eye-shade type in the bowels of 
the bureaucracy”274), the Council watered down or killed “regulations on 
federal rules relating to commercial aircraft noise, bank liability on 
property loans, housing accessibility for the disabled, clothing makers’ 
right to work at home, disclosure requirements on pensions, protection of 
underground water from landfill runoff, reporting requirements for child-
care facilities located in religious institutions, and fees for real estate 
settlements”275—not to mention various EPA regulations aimed at limiting 
pollution from municipal incinerators, protecting wetlands, or preventing 
air-quality degradation.276 
The Council’s modus operandi was to intervene quietly in 
rulemakings in an effort to persuade or coerce agencies to relax regulatory 
burdens on American businesses while “leaving . . . ‘no fingerprints’ on the 
results of its interventions.”277  The secrecy was necessary, reasoned 
Quayle’s aides, because many of these issues were “political loser[s]”—a 
strong indication that the primary purpose of the Council’s efforts was not 
to assure fidelity to some broadly conceived national interest.278  M o r e  
disturbing still from the perspective of public-choice theory, “[i]n almost 
every city he visits as a campaigner, Quayle holds closed-door round tables 
with business people who have made sizable contributions to the local or 
national GOP.  Hubbard [the Council’s executive director],  .  .  . often 
travels with Quayle and sits in on these sessions.”279  The implication that 
the Council parlayed deregulatory initiatives in exchange for campaign 
contributions is difficult to avoid. 
At least in the case of the Council on Competitiveness, decisional 
proximity to the President did nothing to prevent a quintessential instance 
of agency capture.  Its example cuts hard into the optimistic view that 
centralizing review authority in the President’s office will generally serve 
to mitigate public choice pressures.  There is moreover little reason to think 
that it is merely an isolated instance.  As a theoretical matter and as a 
matter of historical record, the president shares with other governmental 
actors similar vulnerabilities to interest-group pressures.  Solidifying his 
already-substantial control over the administrative state will therefore have 
the perverse result of amplifying the power of those groups that are in a 
position to exert undue influence of the President while doing nothing to 
minimize industry group influence at the administrative level. 
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RETHINKING CENTRALIZED REVIEW 
Having shown that the checking function rests on implausible 
analytical foundations, we can safely conclude that OIRA’s single-minded 
focus on preventing over-regulation is far too narrow.280  In this Section, we 
go one step further.  We contend that, while an invigorated commitment to 
even-handed cost-benefit analysis would be a salutary devleopment, OIRA 
could and should do far more to embrace its role as a harmonizing 
influence in the cacophanous regulatory state.  Indeed, it would be 
astonishing if cost-benefit analysis were the only regulatory dimension ripe 
for centralization; other issues that OIRA has largely ignored must be 
equally amenable to centralized review.281   
A note of caution is in order, however.  The range of issues that could 
in principle be centralized is of course limitless, and the relative merits of 
centralization in any particular case will turn on a host of context-specific 
considerations.  What are the relative aptitudes (e.g., scientific, economic, 
technical) of the single-mission and centralizing agencies?  Is there value in 
promoting experimentation with regulatory alternatives at single-mission 
agencies?282  Will centralization further economies of scale or create a 
bureaucratic morass?  Is there a particular need for uniformity?   
Ascertaining whether an issue is amenable to regulatory centralization is 
thus at least as difficult as figuring out whether the federal government or 
states should accept responsibility for various governmental functions.283  
While the wholesale resolution of these difficult questions is beyond the 
scope of this article, however, we submit that, just as it is plainly not the 
case that neither the federal nor the state governments should have a 
policy-making monopoly, so too is it plain that the centralization of at least 
some regulatory functions would promote rational decision-making. 
We therefore offer in this Section a sketch of two areas in which 
centralization would appear to be uniquely appropriate.  In neither case 
would centralization preempt vigorous inter-agency innovation; both 
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involve agency functions that are uniquely amenable to centralized 
oversight; and uniformity in both would confer significant regulatory 
advantages, as we explain more thoroughly below.  While we shelve an in-
depth theoretical consideration of the virtues and drawbacks of 
centralization, we offer these two concrete suggestions as useful starting 
points for a reinvigorated discussion of the merits of centralized regulatory 
review. 
First, a centralized agency should provide standardized scientific 
guidelines to the regulatory agencies to aid them in undertaking risk 
assessments, particularly with respect to carcinogens.  Although OIRA has 
recently taken some limited steps in this direction, most prominently in its 
aggressive promotion of the use of peer-reviewed studies in agency risk 
assessments, it has for the most part not embraced the salutary role that it 
could play in harmonizing the manner in which regulatory agencies 
approach quantitative risk assessment for carcinogenic risks.  Government-
wide cancer guidelines promulgated by a centralized agency with the 
power to ensure that agencies took them seriously would promote 
consistency, increase transparency, and vest in one agency the 
responsibility for ensuring that advances in cancer research were folded 
quickly into the regulatory apparatus. 
Second, centralized review should involve a consideration of the 
distributional consequences of all regulations.  Commentators normally say 
that individual agencies should not worry about large-scale distributional 
consequences because tax-and-transfer policy can minimize any   
distributional problems in light of the cumulative impact of regulatory 
policy.  But OIRA does not scrutinize the distributional consequences of 
regulation, nor does it have protocols on how to determine them.  By 
determining which groups are unduly burdened or unfairly compensated 
overall, a centralized reviewing agency could provide critical information 
to the political branches and aid them in smoothing regulatory inequities.284 
A.  Science 
A centralized agency armed with substantial scientific expertise might 
in many cases be better-situated than the single-mission agencies to set 
generic guidelines as to how science should be employed in agency risk 
assessments.  Indeed, Executive Order 12,866 contemplates some degree of 
centralized control over the use of science when it mandates that “[e]ach 
agency base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, 
technical, economic, or other information concerning the need for, and 
consequences of, the intended regulation.”285  We begin in this section by 
examining two recent (and related) OIRA efforts to improve the quality of 
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the scientific data upon which agencies rely in undertaking risk 
assessments.  We then turn our attention to one area in which a centralized 
agency could make a substantial and positive difference: namely, in laying 
out uniform, government-wide standards to guide in carcinogenic risk 
assessment. 
1.  Information Quality and Peer Review 
Prodded by Congress, OIRA has recently taken steps to standardize 
and improve the quality of the science upon which regulatory agencies rely 
in making their risk assessments. 
In 2001, Congress enacted without any hearings or debate what has 
become known as the Information Quality Act (IQA).286  The IQA’s 
ostensible purpose—or at least the purpose that can be gleaned from its 
rather spare language, since legislative history is completely lacking—is to 
cure a perceived agency reliance on “bad science” in crafting regulatory 
policy.287  Introduced as a rider to a appropriations bill at the behest of Jim 
Tozzi, a former Reagan-era director of OIRA,288 the IQA mandates that 
OIRA “provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for 
ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of 
information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal 
agencies.”289  The IQA’s bite comes from its requirement that all federal 
agencies establish a formal mechanism to allow private parties to petition 
for the correction of information they allege falis to meet those new OIRA 
guidelines.290 
OIRA released final guidelines in January 2002, explaining that it 
would hold agencies to a high standard of informational “objectivity”—a 
term that OIRA defines broadly to “involv[e] a focus on ensuring accurate, 
reliable, and unbiased information.”291  More important still, in December 
2004, OIRA drew on its authority under the IQA as well as its general 
oversight powers to issue an “information quality bulletin” (also known as 
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its “peer review guidelines”)292 in which it stated on no uncertain terms that 
“[t]o the extent permitted by law, each agency shall conduct a peer review 
on  all  influential scientific information that the agency intends to 
disseminate.”293  The agencies have substantial discretion in choosing the 
mechanism of peer review (e.g., in specifying the number of peer 
reviewers, or their level of expertise294), and are instructed to “weigh the 
benefits and costs of using a particular peer review mechanism for a 
specific information product.”295  F o r  highly  influential information, 
however—defined as scientific assessments that “could have a potential 
impact of $500 million  in any year, or . . . [are] novel, controversial, or 
precedent-setting or ha[ve] significant interagency contact”—OIRA limits 
that discretion and imposes certain minimum requirements to ensure the 
expertise of the peer reviewers, disclose their conflicts of interest, and 
enforce a high level of transparency.296 
The peer review and data quality guidelines reflect ex ante and ex post 
efforts, respectively, to rid the bureaucracy of its reliance on “bad 
science.”297  In order to catch that “bad science” before it gets out the door, 
OIRA’s uniform peer review guidelines “engage the scientific community 
in the regulatory process” and thereby “make regulatory science more 
competent and credible.”298  And in case any “bad science” slips through, 
the IQA provides interested parties with an after-the-fact opportunity to 
challenge that information as insufficiently “objective.” 
There have been numerous suggestions that both initiatives reflect 
efforts to inject industry further into the rulemaking process, and 
particularly that the IQA’s petition requirements will interfere with notice-
and-comment rulemaking, impose delay, and have a sharp anti-regulatory 
impact.299  The merits of this debate is beyond the scope of this article.  We 
merely offer the data quality and peer review guidelines as examples of the 
centralization of scientific methods used by regulatory agencies—a 
development that in general we regard as salutary, the appropriateness of 
these particular efforts notwithstanding. 
2.  Cancer Guidelines 
It is a truism that the science upon which regulatory agencies must 
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rely in setting health-and-safety standards is inadequate to ground clear 
conclusions about the scope of actual risks,300 particularly with respect to 
low-dose human exposure to carcinogenic substances.301  Whether the data 
are drawn from epidemiological studies, animal assays, or in vitro 
mutagenicity tests, regulators must invariably make a number of strong 
assumptions (also known as “science-policy judgments”) in order to 
develop what is, essentially, their best guess as to the “real” risk that a 
carcinogen poses to the general public.302 
In undertaking carcinogenic risk assessment, different agencies 
currently rely on different assumptions.  The result can be widely divergent 
risk assessments for the same carcinogen, with potentially enormous 
impacts on the stringency of regulation.303  Such determinations, therefore, 
are particularly good candidates for a centralizing influence. 
a.  A Concise History of Inference Guidelines 
In a highly influential 1983 report, the National Research Council 
(NRC) trained its attention on the problems posed by the necessity of 
making science-policy judgments.304  Colloquially known as the Red Book, 
the NRC publication advocated for the use of “inference guidelines”—
which it defined as “explicit statement[s] of a predetermined choice among 
the options that arise in inferring human risk that are not fully adequate or 
not drawn directly from human experience”305—to guide carcinogenic risk 
assessments within the various federal agencies.  The Red Book provided 
several justifications for its support of inference guidelines: to make it 
easier for risk assessors to justify their decisions to courts, regulated 
entities, and the general public; to make a particularly knotty science-policy 
decision once so as to avoid making the same decision in every individual 
risk assessment; to diminish the influence of perceived or actual political 
biases; to ensure that a centralized team within the agency, operating in 
close contact with the scientific community, can fold the latest in 
carcinogenic research into risk assessments; and to impose some measure 
of uniformity among agency cancer-reduction efforts among chemicals, 
thereby promoting rational priority-setting.306 
The Red Book wanted more than agency-specific guidelines, however.  
 
  300 See, e.g., CARNEGIE  COMMISSION,  supra  note 28, at [x] (“[T]he scientific basis for 
regulation is riddled with uncertainties, and like economic analysis, even  at its best science fails 
to answer most of the hard questions in regulation.”). 
  301 G RAHAM ET AL., supra note 194, at 153 (noting “the lack of information about human 
dose-response curves at the doses that are important to regulatory policy”). 
  302 For an extensive list of science-policy judgments that must be made with respect to 
different forms of data, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL 
MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 29-33 (1983) [hereinafter RED BOOK]. 
  303 See  GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 194 (offering two case studies of the use of scientific 
evidence in decision making). 
  304 See  RED BOOK, supra note 302. 
  305 Id.  at 51. 
  306 See  id.   at 69-82.  
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It also staunchly supported the development of cancer guidelines that 
would apply to all regulatory agencies.307  With respect to the four agencies 
that deal regularly with carcinogenic risks—EPA, OSHA, CPSC, and the 
FDA—the NRC reasoned that all of the arguments in favor of agency-wide 
carcinogen guidelines applied with at least equal force to the adoption of 
guidelines with broader application.  “The use of different guidelines by the 
agencies could undermine the credibility of [agency] risk assessments,” 
reducing public faith in the regulatory process, providing strategic 
opportunities for private interests to derail public-serving regulatory 
efforts,308 and—most importantly—making it more difficult to set priorities 
among cancer-reduction efforts at the various agencies.309 
  The idea that the regulatory agencies should operate under a common 
framework for assessing carcinogenic risks was not entirely new, even in 
1983.  During President Carter’s administration, the Interagency 
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG),310 made up of representatives from 
EPA, OSHA, FDA, and CPSC, attempted to cobble together a uniform 
cancer policy “to ensure that the regulatory agencies evaluate carcinogenic 
risk consistently.”311  Although IRLG did eventually come up with a 
generic cancer policy that it published in both the federal register and in a 
peer-reviewed journal,312 inter-agency wrangling over its substantive 
content resulted in broad, “treatylike”313 language that did little to provide 
meaningful guidance to the regulatory agencies.314  Even that bland policy 
statement failed to garner support from OSHA.315  More importantly, 
without a centralized authority to bind the agencies, the generic policy had 
“no official legal status”316 and did little to promote consistency.317  
President Reagan disbanded the IRLG in 1981—ironically, at about the 
same time that he was ramping up efforts to centralize other aspects of 
regulatory decision-making. 
 
  307 See  id.; see also Rosenthal et al., supra note 194, at 272 (“Although risk assessments are 
now commonplace at many federal and state agencies, there are no uniform guidelines that 
specify how regulatory officials should calculate chemical risks.”). 
  308 See  RED BOOK, supra note 302, at 80. 
  309 See  id.  at 80; see also id. at 79 (concluding that “[a]gency [carcinogen] guidelines have 
varied markedly in form and content,” and predicting that “[w]ithout a deliberate coordinating 
effort, there is no reason to assume that guidelines will become more nearly uniform.”). 
  310  For a comprehensive history of IRLG’s cancer policy efforts, see MARK K. LANDY ET AL., 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING ALL THE WRONG QUESTIONS 172-203 
(1990). 
  311 R ED BOOK, supra note 302, at 60-62. 
  312  Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 44 
Fed. Reg. 39858 (1979); Work Group on Risk Assessment, Scientific Bases for Identification of 
Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 63 J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 242 (1979). 
  313 C ARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x]. 
  314 L ANDY ET AL., supra note 310, at 199 (“much interagency inconsistency remained”). 
  315 See  id.  at 194-96. 
  316 See RED BOOK, supra note 302, at 61.  See also LANDY ET AL., supra note 310, at 195 
(“[T]he status of the IRLG document was ambiguous.”). 
  317 See  CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (noting that agency staff “did not feel 
bound by the final agreement” and that “considerable inconsistency remained in the risk 
assessment practices in the various agencies”).  
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The Red Book brought the issue back to the foreground of the debate 
over regulatory reform, and during the 1980s some halting steps were made 
towards the formulation and implementation of uniform cancer guidelines.  
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) took the first of 
those steps in 1985 when it issued a set of “general principles that can be 
used [by federal agencies] to establish guidelines for assessing carcinogenic 
risk.”318  The OSTP report largely concerned itself with articulating the 
current state of scientific understanding with respect to cancer risk, 
however, and shied away from weighing in on the controversial 
assumptions that agencies must make when using gap-ridden science to 
form cancer policies.319 
William Ruckelshaus, the well-respected head of EPA from 1983-85, 
took the next step.  Relying heavily on both the Red Book and the OSTP 
report,320 he pushed EPA to formulate a set of agency-specific generic 
cancer guidelines in 1986321 and announced his support for the 
standardization of a broader set of science-policy assumptions across the 
regulatory state: 
The explicit and open codification suggested by the NRC will . . . ensure 
that the assumptions used in risk assessment will at least be uniform 
among all agencies that adopt them, will be plausible scientifically, and 
will reflect a predictable and relatively constant policy amid this 
complex and chaotic hybrid discipline.  It also offers the possibility that 
one day all the protective agencies of government will speak with one 
voice when they address risks, so that estimates of risk will be 
comparable among agencies and the public at last will be able to make a 
fair comparison of the individual risk-management decisions of separate 
agencies.322 
While Ruckelshaus eventually succeeded in setting cancer guidelines 
at EPA, he failed to establish uniform inter-agency standards.  His creation 
of the Interagency Risk Management Council (IRMC) proved fruitless; the 
agency “did not last long enough to make much of an impact” and was 
disbanded in 1984.323  OIRA, enchanted with its deregulatory mission, had 
no appetite for taking on any coordinating role.  Standardization efforts 
have stalled ever since. 
The calls for centralization have persisted, however.  In 1993, Justice 
 
  318  Chemical Carcinogens; Review of the Science and its Associated Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 
10,372, 10,374 (Mar. 14, 1985). 
  319 Id.  at 10375 (“This document attempts to leave the majority of these necessary scientific 
inferences [science-policy judgments] to the scientific regulatory agencies.”); see  CARNEGIE 
COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (“OSTP recognized in 1985 that a distinction existed between 
science and science policy and strove to deal only with the former.”). 
  320 N ATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 5 (1994) 
(“In 1986, EPA issued risk-assessment guidelines that were generally consistent with the Red 
Book recommendations.”); CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (reporting that EPA 
guidelines “drew heavily on the background provided by the OSTP principles”). 
  321 William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, in NATIONAL  ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1985). 
  322 Id.  at [x]. 
  323 M ARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY 148 (1986).  
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Breyer called for the creation of a reinvigorated centralized oversight 
process that would “try to make explicit, and more uniform, controversial 
assumptions that agencies now, implicitly and often inconsistently, use in 
reaching their decisions.”324  In 1995, a distinguished panel of regulatory 
commentators pulled together under the auspices of the Carnegie 
Commission criticized EPA, OSHA, FDA, and CPSC for “employ[ing] 
their own sets of assumptions to assess risks,” and recommended the 
creation of a “new coordination body” to help align several features of 
regulatory decision-making, including agencies’ cancer policies.325  And in 
1997, the Presidential / Congressional Commission reported that “[r]isk 
assessment practices are poorly coordinated among and often within 
regulatory agencies and programs, even among those with overlapping 
interests and jurisdictions,” and called for agencies to “coordinate their risk 
assessment methods and assumptions” whenever regulating for similar 
health risks associated with chronic exposure.326  Even John Graham, 
together with two associates, Alon Rosenthal and Gray, has argued that “[a] 
strong White House role coordinating agency activities offers the hope of 
resolving some of the current inconsistencies in risk assessment 
practices.”327 
b.  Variation in Carcinogenic Risk Assessment Practices 
Despite these repeated calls for the establishment of uniform cancer 
guidelines, considerable variability among the cancer policies of regulatory 
agencies persists.  For starters, not all agencies have issued written 
guidelines.  FDA has never done so,328 and OSHA’s “cancer policy” 
document—first published in 1980 and never revised—was rendered 
immediately obsolete by the Benzene decision.329 
 
  324 B REYER, supra note 116, at 65. 
  325 C ARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (Chapter 5).  See also id. at [x] (“[I]t would 
be highly beneficial if White House offices worked more closely in developing guidelines for 
evaluating risk . . . .”). 
  326 P RESIDENTIAL  /  CONGRESSIONAL  COMMISSION ON RISK  ASSESSMENT AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING, 
Vol. 2, at 107 (1997) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL / CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION].  In addition, 
in 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued a report calling for the creation of a 
“national leader in the White House in a position equivalent to the ‘Drug Czar’ or ‘AIDS Czar,’ 
[who] could bring national visibility and unify and coordinate [risk assessment] research activities 
across agencies.”  Although more concerned with ensuring the appropriate allocation of scientific 
resources than with establishing cancer guidelines, the tone of the report reflects a frustration with 
the balkanization of risk assessment efforts and bemoans “[t]he absence of an identified central 
leader in risk assessment research.”  OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT,  RESEARCHING 
HEALTH RISKS 11-12 (1993). 
  327  Rosenthal et al., supra note 194 at 358.  See also id. at 362 (“We support the concept of an 
executive order to strengthen the role of the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy in harmonizing risk assessment practice.”).  But see GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 194, at 
208-11 (1988) (arguing against the use of standardized guidelines). 
  328 See  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: SELECTED FEDERAL 
AGENCIES’  PROCEDURES,  ASSUMPTIONS, AND POLICIES 158-59 (2001) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT]. 
  329  Industrial Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see Lorenz Rhomberg, 
A Survey of Methods for Chemical Health Risk Assessment Among Federal Regulatory Agencies,  
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With or without written guidelines, however, EPA, FDA, OSHA, and 
CPSC all rely on default assumptions to guide them in their risk 
assessments.330  And although there are many areas of substantive 
agreement among the agencies—for example, the agencies normally 
assume that there is no safe threshold level below which a carcinogen poses 
zero risk331—the most exhaustive survey of the different risk assessment 
practices at EPA, FDA, OSHA, and CPSC, conducted by Lorenz 
Rhomberg in 1993 under the auspices of the Presidential / Congressional 
Commission, concluded unequivocally that “current practices in these areas 
vary among Federal agencies and even among regulatory programs within 
the EPA.”332  A 2001 GAO report on EPA, FDA, and OSHA confirmed 
Rhomberg’s findings, reporting that “[a]lthough there were more 
similarities than differences in the general risk assessment procedures, 
there were also some notable differences in the agencies’ specific 
approaches, methods, and assumptions.”333 
A few examples are revealing.  First, as EPA’s and CPSC’s guidelines 
demonstrate, regulatory agencies show remarkable diversity in the 
sophistication with which they approach carcinogenic risk assessment.  As 
the Presidential / Congressional Commission, relying on Rhomberg’s 
study, noted 
EPA relies on the “maximally exposed individual” or, now, other upper-
end exposure estimates while CPSC uses the average population 
exposure; EPA uses upper-bound risk estimates while CPSC uses 
maximum-likelihood estimates; EPA uses pharmacokinetics information 
for cross-species extrapolation, but CPSC declines doing so.334 
Second, consider the variations in agencies’ default choice of low-
dose response extrapolation method.  Risk assessors use various 
methodologies to translate the high-dose results of their animal bioassays 
into best guesses as at how the particular carcinogen will affect humans at 
the lower doses prevalent in the surrounding environment.  FDA uses a 
linear model;335 OSHA uses “a particular no-threshold linear approach 
 
at 32 (“Although the agency has published a ‘cancer policy’ document, much of its content has 
been affected by the benzene decision.”); GAO REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 328, at 
186 (reporting that “OSHA currently has no formal internal risk assessment guidance.”). 
  330 See,  e.g., id. at 170 (“FDA officials said that their agency does not require the use of 
specific default assumptions or risk assessment methods, but there are assumptions and methods 
that typically have been used as standard choices in FDA risk assessments.”).  For a discussion of 
FDA risk assessment practices, see D.W. Gaylor et al., Health Risk Assessment Practices in the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 26 (1997). 
  331 GAO REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 328, at 40. 
  332  Rhomberg (from shortened version of article in Presidential / Congressional Commission 
Appendix), at 2. 
  333 GAO  REPORT ON RISK  ASSESSMENT,  supra  note 328, at 46.  The GAO report also 
examined the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), a regulatory arm of DOT. 
  334 P RESIDENTIAL  /  CONGRESSIONAL  COMMISSION,  supra  note 326, at 107-08.  See also 
Guidelines for Determining Chronic Toxicity of Products Subject to the FHSA, 57 Fed. Reg. 
46,626 (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter CPSC Guidelines] (detailing differences with EPA’s 1986 
guidelines). 
  335 See  GAO REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 328, at 41.  
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known as the maximum likelihood estimate in the Crump-Howe 
reparametrization of the multistage model;”336 and CPSC uses a linearized 
multistage model.337  EPA’s more-flexible methodology recommends a 
linear model but allows the use of a non-linear model when the available 
evidence on a carcinogen’s mode of action indicates that it would be 
appropriate.338  Concededly, in any particular case the difference between a 
linear model and a linear multistage model is likely to be small (although if 
EPA chooses to employ a non-linear model, the difference will be 
substantial).339  But if these distinctions in methodology seem insignificant, 
consider that the choice of low-dose response extrapolation method is just 
one out of fifty important “trans-scientific” choices that the Red Book 
identified.340  Slight variations along a number of dimensions compound 
differences in risk assessment,341 resulting in “the wildly different 
‘scientific conclusions’ reached by sister agencies or even sister 
departments of the same agency at the same time under the same 
administration concerning the carcinogenic potential of the same toxic 
substance.”342 
Third, variations in the choice of inter-species scaling factors have 
historically been a source of dramatic differences in risk assessment 
outcomes, although some steps towards uniformity have recently been 
taken.  Agencies rely on scaling factors when taking the dosage 
administered to an animal (typically a rat) in a bioassay and extrapolating 
from that the dosage that would have the equivalent effect in a human.  
Traditionally, FDA and OSHA assumed that the relationship between the 
potency of a carcinogen in rats and its potency in humans should be scaled 
based on body weight, whereas EPA and CPSC assumed that the scaling 
factor should be based on surface area.343  Body-weight scaling is a less-
protective assumption, and projects risks in rat assays that are between four 
and six times lower than the surface-area calculation.344  Despite the fact 
that “[t]his variation stands among the chief causes of variation among 
estimates of a chemical’s potential human risk, even when assessments are 
based on the same data,” neither assumption was clearly preferable on 
scientific grounds.345  The “awkward result [was] that different agencies 
[could] arrive at different characterizations of an agent’s carcinogenic 
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  338 See  GAO REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 328, at 41. 
  339 See  id.  at 73. 
  340 R ED BOOK, supra note 302. 
  341 C ARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 28, at [x] (“Worse probably than the occasional high-
profile mistake is the sum of the myriad inefficiencies and inconsistencies that result from lack of 
interagency communication, any one of which by itself might be considered minor.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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  343 See  Rhomberg, supra note 329, at 75. 
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  345  Draft Report: A Cross-Species Scaling Factor for Carcinogen Risk Assessment Based on 
Equivalence of mg/kg3/4/Day, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,152, 24,153 (June 5, 1992).  
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potency from the same set of data, based only on differences in preferred 
methods and precedents from earlier analyses.”346 
Without a centralized coordinating body with the power to impose a 
particular assumption on the agencies, it has proven difficult for the 
agencies to cooperate to iron out their differences.  EPA, FDA, and CPSC 
did begin in the late 1980s to collaborate, under the auspices of the Habicht 
Committee, on an inter-agency draft document laying out a middle-range 
default assumption that body mass to the ¾ power should be used as the 
cross-species scaling factor.347  That draft was never adopted by the three 
agencies involved, however—although it appears that they normally abide 
by it—and OSHA continues to rely on linear body-weight scaling.348  As 
Justice Breyer points out, interagency coordination efforts “typically suffer 
from their ad hoc status  .  .  . [and] rarely exist long enough, or have 
sufficient authority, to see that their recommendations are implemented.”349 
Without a centralized body overseeing both the promulgation and 
implementation of guidelines, standardizing the assumptions employed in 
carcinogenic risk assessments across agencies are unlikely to occur.   
Guidelines could reduce the appearance of regulatory arbitrariness,350 
improve regulatory accountability,351 mitigate parochial agency-specific 
tendencies to systematically under- or over-estimate risk, provide a 
clearinghouse for regulators and cancer researchers to ensure that risk 
assessments are in line with the latest advances, and allow for the 
meaningful comparison of risk-reduction programs across agencies.352 
There are undoubtedly facets of risk assessments that are not 
amenable to centralization.  The Red Book, for example, counsels against 
centralizing exposure assessment standards because the agencies could 
bring their expertise to bear on the likelihood of exposure in different 
settings.353  It is nevertheless the case that “harmonization of [risk 
assessment] methods to the extent achievable would be beneficial.”354 
 
  346 Rhomberg,  supra note 329, at 152. 
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B.  Distribution 
Regulatory policies that maximize net benefits across the whole 
population often impose disproportionate costs on a subset of that 
population.355  As a result, regulations that appear attractive on cost-benefit 
grounds may be more difficult to justify on grounds of equity.  Although 
Reagan’s executive order did not include any reference to distribution,356 
recognition of distributional disparities led President Clinton to include in 
Executive Order 12,866 a directive requiring agencies to consider 
“distributive impacts” and “equity” as potential “costs” of regulations for 
cost-benefit purposes.357  To that same end, Clinton also issued Executive 
Order 12,898 on environmental justice, which requires each agency to 
“identif[y] and addres[s] disproportionately high and adverse human health 
or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on 
minority populations and low-income populations.”358  The ostensible hope 
was that agency consideration of distributional consequences would 
smooth some of the inequities generated by regulatory policymaking. 
It has not worked out like that.  Executive Order 12,866’s admonition 
to quantify distributional effects as a “cost” of regulation borders on the 
incoherent,359 and indeed OIRA takes the position that cost-benefit analysis 
should “ignor[e] distributional effects” in order to provide meaningful 
guidance to regulators.360  Its position is fully consistent with the 
conventional view that cost-benefit analysis should “separate out the 
distributional issues and isolate the efficiency issue.”361  OIRA therefore 
requires agencies to consider distributional consequences separately from 
 
both within agencies and across agencies.  GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 194, at 208-11 (1988).  
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186 (2000).  An absolutely rigid separation of efficiency and distributional concerns is in most 
circumstances impossible, however.  When a consumer’s demand for a good varies with income, 
a change in distribution will change the degree to which that consumer values some goods 




Executive Order 12,898 is similarly ineffective as a mechanism for 
taking distribution seriously.  Its language is wholly precatory and it is not 
a prominent feature of regulatory decision-making.363  A number of 
congressional efforts to require meaningful consideration of the 
distributional consequences of regulations have stalled so far.364 
The traditional economic perspective counsels that any undesirable 
distributional consequences of regulations should be allayed through tax-
and-transfer policy.365  So long as agencies maximize net benefits, more 
efficient mechanisms of redistribution than cumbersome regulatory 
recalibration are available to ensure that one group does not bear 
disproportionate regulatory costs.366  This is particularly so because 
regulations are cumulative; one agency’s efforts to shift a disproportionate 
regulatory burden from Group A to Group B may be offset by another 
agency’s efforts to shift costs in precisely the opposite direction.367  On this 
view, agencies should be insensitive to distributional consequences that can 
be better addressed centrally in light of the cumulative effect of 
regulations.368 
The often-unspoken predicate to redistributive tax-and-transfer 
policies, however, is some analytically rigorous understanding of which 
groups bear the cumulative costs and benefits of regulations.369  Put more 
succinctly, before the government can correct for distributional inequities it 
has to know what those inequities are.370 
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OIRA, with its almost exclusive focus on regulatory costs, has so far 
dodged any responsibility for developing protocols that agencies could use 
to determine the distributional impacts of a particular regulation—much 
less implemented any mechanisms to tally cumulative distributional 
impacts.  In the same circular providing exhaustive guidance on the 
implementation of cost-benefit analysis, OIRA devoted just two paragraphs 
to a discussion of the distributional consequences of regulation.371  Given 
the difficulty of disentangling who pays and who benefits from a particular 
regulation, OIRA’s emphasis (or rather lack thereof) sends a clear message 
that consideration of distributional consequences is a peripheral concern at 
best.  Regulatory agencies have gotten that message and, in general, pay 
little attention to distribution: for example, Cass Sunstein reports that “[i]n 
its voluminous materials on the effects of [its] new arsenic rule . . . the EPA 
does not say a word about whether poor people would bear the sometimes 
significant costs of the regulation.”372  Although OIRA issues an exhaustive 
annual report tallying the costs and benefits of government-wide 
regulations, it issues no similar report on the distributional effects of 
regulation.373  Without having a sense of what distributional inequities exist 
across the regulatory state, it is hard to understand just how Congress is 
supposed to flex its tax-and-transfer power to even them out. 
In their recent work on welfare economics, Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell recognize this problem but argue that “there may be no need 
separately to identify the redistributive effects of legal rules, especially of 
particular rules, because general data on the distribution of income and 
measures of the standard of living will tend to capture the aggregate of 
distributive effects from all sources.”374  At least in the context of 
regulatory policymaking, however, they are too sanguine about the 
possibility of easily piecing together distributional effects.  Most regulatory 
benefits are not market goods; benefits such as a decrease in the statistical 
chance of getting cancer do not in any realistic sense constitute part of an 
individual’s measurable wealth, nor is it realistic to think that raw quality-
of-life metrics will prove capable of disaggregating statistical reductions in 
cancer risk in particular groups.  It is far more likely that, without sustained 
attention to the question of whether one group persistently bears 
disproportionate regulatory burdens, the distributive effect of our 
regulatory state will remain largely unknown. 
It is also not satisfactory to assert that, over time, the more-or-less 
 
787-88 (1993) (“There has been virtually no accounting of how pollution controls redistribute 
environmental risks among groups of persons.”). 
  371 See  CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 45, at 14. 
  372 Sunstein,  supra note 36, at 2257-58. 
  373 See,  e.g., 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 91.  As a result of  the mandate in the 
Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. 106-554, 31 U.S.C. 1105, the report does consider the 
effects of regulations on small businesses, state, local, and tribal governments, wages, and 
economic growth.  Despite this nascent effort to understand the distributional consequences of 
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  374 Kaplow  &  Shavell,  supra note 366, at n. 64.  
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random distributional effects of hundreds of regulations over many years 
will cancel each other out, leaving the net redistributive effect of the 
regulatory state close to zero—the “everything comes out in the wash” 
theory.  There is simply no persuasive reason to believe that benefits and 
burdens of regulations will fall randomly on different segments of the 
population.375  Indeed, because “[a] policy’s political feasibility is 
influenced strongly by its distributional implications,”376 public-choice 
pressures, political imbalances, and lingering discrimination all suggest that 
the distribution of benefits and burdens will be non-random in a substantial 
fraction of cases.  The burden should therefore be on the proponents of the 
“wash” theory to demonstrate that distributional consequences even out 
over time.  Until then, we do not have the luxury to shut our eyes to 
distributional issues in the comforting but unsupported hope that they will 
somehow evaporate. 
Without understating the difficulty of distributional analysis, then—
and it is a remarkably difficult enterprise377—we take as our touchstone the 
premise that an assessment of the distributional consequences of regulation 
must be a fundamental component of sound regulatory decision-making.378  
Because of its importance, the difficulty of distributional analysis calls not 
for ignoring distributional effects, but for a vigorous and coordinated effort 
to develop methodologies and techniques to aid regulatory agencies in 
assessing them.  If we are serious about mitigating the distributional 
infirmities of cumulative regulations, efforts to standardize, promote, and 
aggregate distributional analyses are not only warranted, but absolutely 
critical. 
A centralized agency committed to distributional analysis should take 
on three tasks.  First, the agency should issue distributional analysis 
guidelines similar in form to OIRA’s guidelines on cost-benefit analysis.379  
Those guidelines should lay out best practices for undertaking 
distributional analyses, along with default assumptions for agencies to 
employ when grappling with thorny recurring issues in distributional 
analysis.  For example, the guidelines should provide breakdowns of the 
relevant subgroups on which distributional analysis should focus—asking 
every agency to consider the distributional effects on standardized deciles 
of the population based on income, wealth, race, or age—to facilitate inter-
 
  375 See Adler & Posner, supra note 361, at 189 (“There is no reason to believe that the people 
who are injured by [regulatory] projects are usually the same as the people who are benefited by 
projects.”). 
  376 See Revesz & Stavins, supra note 355, at 48. 
  377  For a sense of both the difficulties and the possibilities of distributional analysis, see Henry 
M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs, in CURRENT ISSUES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (ed. Paul R. Portney 1978).  For a recent analysis in a similar vein, 
see Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 REG. MAG. NO. 1, at 22 
(2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267073. 
  378 See  Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2257 (“[Agencies] should be required to provide, if feasible, 
a distributional analysis showing exactly who would be helped and hurt by regulation.”). 
  379 See  CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 45 (OIRA’s cost-benefit guidelines).  
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agency comparisons and an eventual aggregation of distributional effects.380 
Second, the centralized agency should insist that agencies undertake 
distributional analyses, and should review those analyses with the same 
critical eye that OIRA currently reviews agencies’ cost-benefit analyses.381  
This undertaking would send a powerful message that the chief executive 
takes distribution seriously, and ensure that agencies do not shirk their 
responsibility to ascertain which groups will bear the burdens and reap the 
benefits of regulations. 
Third, the centralized agency should aggregate those agency analyses 
and make a rough tally of the benefits and burdens associated with 
regulatory rulemakings.  Like its annual reports on the costs and benefits of 
rulemakings,382 OIRA should provide those figures annually to Congress, 
giving it the information necessary to correct for any perceived inequities. 
Whatever the particular methods employed, however, it is important 
for a centralized agency with command over the regulatory state to make 
distributional analysis a core feature of its agenda.  There is no good reason 
that, for more than twenty years, the rhetoric of regulatory centralization 
has focused almost exclusively on the intricacies of cost-benefit analysis 
while leaving something as important as the often-unseen distributional 
consequences of our regulatory state largely unexamined. 
CONCLUSION 
Born out of a desire to minimize compliance costs, and not 
substantially reconsidered since its inception, our modern system of 
regulatory oversight continues to operate as a drag on the promulgation of 
beneficial regulations.  In light of the paucity of theoretical or empirical 
support for the conclusion that the dominant pathology of the regulatory 
state is bureaucratic over-zealousness, it is long past time to rethink how 
centralized oversight should be structured to improve the efficiency, 
rationality, and equity of the regulatory state.  Our hope is that this article 
provokes a reconceptualization of centralized review, unmooring it from its 
historical roots in checking agency behavior and securing it to a more 
broadly conceived mission of harmonizing the operation of our regulatory 
apparatus. 
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